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IMAGINING AN ANTISUBORDINATING
FIRST AMENDMENT
Genevieve Lakier *
Over the past four decades, the political economy of the First
Amendment has undergone a signiﬁcant shift. If in the early twentieth
century winners in First Amendment cases tended to be representatives
of the marginalized and the disenfranchised, these days, they are much
more likely to be corporations and other powerful actors. This Essay
excavates the causes of that change and suggests how it might be remedied. It argues that the shift in First Amendment political economy is
not primarily a consequence of the overly expansive scope of current free
speech law—as some have argued. Nor is it a product of the Court’s free
speech libertarianism. What it reflects instead is the Court’s embrace over
the past several decades of a highly formal conception of the First
Amendment equality guarantee. If the Court once interpreted the First
Amendment to require, or at least permit, substantive equality of expressive opportunity, today the Court insists that the First Amendment
guarantees—and guarantees only—formally equal treatment at the
government’s hands. It is this shift, this Essay argues, that has produced a free speech jurisprudence that tends to favor the powerful and
the propertied. By examining its causes and excavating areas of free
speech law in which the Court has attempted to vindicate a more
substantive conception of expressive equality, this Essay begins the work
of charting out an alternative, more antisubordinating First Amendment.
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INTRODUCTION
Over the past forty years, the political economy of the First Amendment
has undergone a signiﬁcant shift. In the early and mid-twentieth century,
litigants that won First Amendment cases tended to be civil rights groups
like the NAACP,1 proponents of minority religions,2 and other representatives of the marginalized and the disenfranchised.3 These days, the winners
in First Amendment cases are much more likely to be corporations and
other economically and politically powerful actors.4 The result is that
today the First Amendment often serves as the “primary guarantor of the
privileged” rather than the champion of the powerless it used to be.5
Scholars have provided two explanations for the change. Some have
argued that it is a consequence of the decision to extend constitutional
protection to commercial speech and corporate speakers.6 By interpreting
the guarantee of freedom of speech too expansively, they argue, the Court
has allowed the First Amendment to be “hijacked” by corporations and other
business groups and to be turned into a tool of economic deregulation and
corporate power.7 Others attribute the shift in the demographics of the
1. See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460, 466 (1958) (holding
that disclosure of the names of NAACP members to the state of Alabama would violate the
organization's “freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas”).
2. See, e.g., W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (holding
that a policy compelling Jehovah’s Witnesses to recite the pledge of allegiance violated their
First Amendment rights).
3. See, e.g., De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 365–66 (1937) (holding that Oregon’s
Criminal Syndicalism Act was unconstitutional as applied to a member of the Communist
Party who was convicted for conducting a peaceful meeting under the auspices of the party).
4. See John C. Coates IV, Corporate Speech & the First Amendment: History, Data,
and Implications, 30 Const. Comment. 223, 248 (2015) (analyzing “data from Supreme
Court and Circuit Court decisions to illustrate how recently the corporate takeover of the
First Amendment has occurred, and how pervasively and systematically corporations have
been using the First Amendment to achieve de- or re-regulatory goals”).
5. Mark Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 Tex. L. Rev. 1363, 1386 –92 (1984).
6. See, e.g., Daniel J.H. Greenwood, First Amendment Imperialism, 1999 Utah L.
Rev. 659, 659 (“The First Amendment threatens to swallow up all politics. . . . Increasingly,
it acts as a bar to governmental action not just with regard to the issues of conscience and
religious practice with which it began, but far into the realm of economic regulation . . . .”); Jedediah Purdy, Neoliberal Constitutionalism: Lochnerism for a New Economy,
77 Law & Contemp. Probs., no. 4, 2014, at 195, 203 (arguing that decisions like Citizens
United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010), demonstrate “the Court’s march away from a principle
that it accepted with the New Deal: Buying and selling enjoy no special constitutional status”).
7. Tim Wu, The Right to Evade Regulation: How Corporations Hijacked the First
Amendment, New Republic (June 3, 2013), https://newrepublic.com/article/113294/howcorporations-hijacked-ﬁrst-amendment-evade-regulation [https://perma.cc/8TX4-CE8S].
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First Amendment’s beneficiaries to the excessive libertarianism of the contemporary Court. They argue that the Court’s tendency to treat free
speech interests as more important than almost any other competing
interest has produced a First Amendment jurisprudence that is favorable
for corporations, relative to everyone else.8
This Essay suggests a third explanation. It argues that the shift in
the First Amendment’s political economy is not entirely—or even primarily—a consequence of the process Professor Daniel Greenwood has
called “First Amendment imperialism,” which he describes as the “rapid
expansion [of the First Amendment] into areas long thought impervious
to constitutional law,” particularly areas of “economic regulation . . . the
courts had abandoned to the legislatures after the Lochner disaster.”9 Nor
is it a product of the Court’s excessive libertarianism. Indeed, this Essay
challenges the idea that the contemporary Court is particularly libertarian when it comes to freedom of speech.
What this shift reﬂects instead is the Court’s embrace over the past
several decades of a highly formal conception of the First Amendment
equality guarantee. Since the New Deal period, the Court has recognized
that implicit in the First Amendment guarantee of expressive liberty is a
guarantee of expressive equality—that freedom of speech means not only
the right to speak but the right to speak on equal terms as other speakers.10
Over time, however, the Court has signiﬁcantly changed its understanding of what this means.
For much of the twentieth century, the Court interpreted the guarantee of expressive equality in a manner that was sensitive to the economic, political, and social inequalities that inhibited or enhanced
expression.11 It interpreted the First Amendment, for example, to require
that those who lacked other means of expressing themselves be granted
access to publicly important spaces (including privately owned public
spaces) to do so.12 It also struck down laws that, although in principle
8. See, e.g., Tabatha Abu El-Haj, “Live Free or Die”—Liberty and the First Amendment,
78 Ohio St. L.J. 917, 922–23 (2017) (arguing that the “libertarian First Amendment” that
has emerged in recent years poses a real threat to the ability of the regulatory state to perform its core functions); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Two Concepts of Freedom of Speech, 124
Harv. L. Rev 143, 145 (2010) (arguing that decisions such as Citizens United represent the
“triumph of the libertarian over the egalitarian vision of free speech”); Morgan N. Weiland,
Expanding the Periphery and Threatening the Core: The Ascendant Libertarian Speech
Tradition, 69 Stan. L. Rev. 1389, 1397 (2017) (arguing that contemporary First Amendment
law relies on a libertarian vision of the First Amendment that “represents a radical break
from the republican and liberal traditions on which it draws” by “subordinating [listener
rights] to corporate speech rights and eventually nullifying them altogether”).
9. Greenwood, supra note 6, at 659–60 (footnote omitted).
10. See Kenneth L. Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43
U. Chi. L. Rev. 20, 21 (1975).
11. Id.
12. See infra notes 121–134 and accompanying text.
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applicable to all, had a disparate impact on the ability of the poor and
the powerless to communicate.13 And it refused to invalidate on First
Amendment grounds laws that restricted the speech of the powerful in
an effort to enhance the speech of the powerless.14 It interpreted the
First Amendment, in other words, to guarantee—or at least permit—a
rough kind of substantive equality in expressive opportunity.
Since the 1970s, however, the Court has moved increasingly far away
from this context-sensitive, substantive-equality-promoting view of the First
Amendment. It has rejected the idea that courts should take into account
inequalities in economic and political power when interpreting the First
Amendment command.15 It has also, for the most part, rejected the idea
that the First Amendment permits the government to limit the speech of
wealthy or powerful speakers in order to enhance the speech of others.16
Instead, it has interpreted the guarantee of expressive equality to require—
and to require only—formally equal treatment at the government’s hands.
It is this change in the Court’s conception of what it means to
guarantee expressive equality that is largely responsible, this Essay argues,
for the “corporate takeover” of the First Amendment.17 And it is a problem,
not only because it means in practice that the First Amendment frequently fails to protect the expressive freedom of those who lack the economic resources to communicate effectively in our highly commodiﬁed
public sphere. Indeed, this shift is so troubling because it undermines as
a result the robust and inclusive public debate that the First Amendment
is supposed to make possible.
Taking stock of the present state of free speech jurisprudence thus
requires taking stock of this change in the Court’s understanding of
expressive equality. Doing so also obviously has normative implications. If
the problem posed by the contemporary free speech doctrine is simply
that it renders too much ordinary economic regulation subject to judicial
scrutiny and that it makes that judicial scrutiny too demanding when it
applies, then the obvious response is to narrow the scope of the First
Amendment (to decolonize the empire, in other words) and to weaken
the intensity of its protections. But if the problem with contemporary
free speech doctrine is an egalitarianism that tends to favor both government and private power, what is needed is not a weaker and a narrower First
Amendment but a different First Amendment—one that functions better
to protect the expressive freedom of the powerless. What needs to change, in
other words, is not the strength of the speech right but its meaning.
13. See infra notes 39–42 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 43–44 and accompanying text.
15. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48–49 (1976) (per curiam).
16. Id.; see also Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 564 U.S. 721,
736–40 (2011); Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 742 (2008).
17. Coates, supra note 4, at 265.
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This Essay begins the work of charting out that alternative—an “antisubordinating” First Amendment—by pointing to the areas of case law in
which the Court has attempted to vindicate a more substantive conception
of expressive equality. It proceeds in three parts. Part I describes the recent
shift in free speech jurisprudence toward a more formal conception of expressive equality. Part II canvasses some of the doctrinal areas in which the Court
once sought to vindicate substantive equality. Part III addresses some of the
arguments that might be made against an antisubordinating approach.
I. TWO VISIONS OF EQUALITY
It is by now well known that, when it comes to the Equal Protection
Clause, there has been signiﬁcant and enduring disagreement about
what it means to guarantee equal protection of the law.18 On one view—a
view that is, at present, embraced by a majority of the members of the
Supreme Court—what the Equal Protection Clause guarantees is formal
equality.19 On this view, the government violates its obligation to provide
equal protection when it treats people differently because of their race,
gender, or a limited number of other morally irrelevant and historically
freighted “suspect” categories—at least absent an extremely good reason
for doing so.20 The government lives up to its equality obligations, in contrast, when it treats individuals of different races or genders the same;
that is, when it adopts, in relation to its citizens, “color-blind”21 or “genderblind”22 goggles.

18. See Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil Rights Tradition:
Anticlassiﬁcation or Antisubordination?, 58 U. Miami L. Rev. 9, 10 (2003) (describing the
“antisubordination” and “anticlassiﬁcation” approaches, as well as the Supreme Court’s
adoption of the latter).
19. See Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, The Constitutional Future of Race-Neutral
Efforts to Achieve Diversity and Avoid Racial Isolation in Elementary and Secondary
Schools, 50 B.C. L. Rev. 277, 315 (2009) (“The Court’s current approach to equal protection, which has been labeled an antidiscrimination, anticlassiﬁcation, or color-blind
approach, emphasizes the impropriety of government use of racial classiﬁcations.”).
20. See Balkin & Siegel, supra note 18, at 10 (“Roughly speaking, [the anticlassiﬁcation] principle holds that the government may not classify people either overtly or
surreptitiously on the basis of a forbidden category: for example, their race.”).
21. See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701,
748 (2007) (plurality opinion) (Roberts, C.J.) (asserting that “[t]he way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race”); Regents of the
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 291 (1978) (plurality opinion) (Powell, J.) (“Racial
and ethnic distinctions of any sort are inherently suspect and thus call for the most exacting judicial examination.”).
22. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996) (“Parties who seek to
defend gender-based government action must demonstrate an ‘exceedingly persuasive
justiﬁcation’ for that action.” (quoting Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273
(1979))).
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On another view—one articulated in earlier cases such as Strauder v.
West Virginia 23 and Shelley v. Kraemer,24 and embraced today by a minority
of Justices on the Court25—what equal protection requires is something
more substantive. On this view, the government fails to provide equal
protection of the law when it allows its institutions to be used to perpetuate the de facto, even if not de jure, second-class status of some members
of society.26 What determines, on this view, whether a law equally protects
is not the form it takes or the purposes that motivate it but its effects on a
complex social environment. As a result, formally identical treatment
does not necessarily satisfy equal protection, nor does formally dissimilar
treatment necessarily violate it. In fact, some proponents of this more
context-sensitive conception of equal protection have argued that not only
does the Fourteenth Amendment not prohibit the government from making
suspect distinctions; in some cases, it may mandate them—when, for
example, there is no other way the government can avoid perpetuating the
second-class status of members of historically disenfranchised groups.27
As should be obvious from these thumbnail descriptions, whether a
court adopts one or the other view of the Equal Protection Clause will
affect the outcome it reaches in a wide variety of cases. In cases involving
challenges to race-based affirmative action laws and policies, as well as in
cases involving constitutional challenges to formally neutral laws that
have a signiﬁcantly disparate impact on one group or another, the difference between the formal and substantive—or what sometimes get called
the “anticlassificatory”28 and “antisubordinating”29—conceptions of equal

23. 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
24. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
25. See Reva B. Siegel, From Colorblindness to Antibalkanization: An Emerging
Ground of Decision in Race Equality Cases, 120 Yale L.J. 1278, 1305 (2011) (“The four
dissenting Justices in Parents Involved express key tenets of the antisubordination understanding of Brown.”).
26. Kraemer, 334 U.S. at 19–21 (holding that judicial enforcement of racially restrictive covenants violates the Equal Protection Clause by using “the full coercive power of
government to deny [to some] . . . rights of ownership or occupancy enjoyed as a matter of
course by other citizens of different race or color”); Strauder, 100 U.S. at 308 (asserting
that the purpose of the Equal Protection Clause is to protect ex-slaves and their descendants from “legal discriminations [that] . . . lessen[] the security of their enjoyment of the
rights which others enjoy” and from “discriminations which are steps towards reducing
them to the condition of a subject race”).
27. David A. Strauss, The Myth of Colorblindness, 1986 Sup. Ct. Rev. 99, 128 (“It [is]
plausible [to conclude] . . . that affirmative action is constitutionally required [because] it
is divisive and harmful to society to exclude nearly all blacks from important social institutions and beneﬁts, even when that exclusion is the product of race-neutral criteria.”).
28. Genevieve Lakier, Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Arizona, and the Rise of the Anticlassificatory
First Amendment, 2016 Sup. Ct. Rev. 233, 236.
29. Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: Sex, Race, and Equal Protection, 61
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1003, 1010 n.18 (1986).
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protection really matters.30 Indeed, scholars have convincingly argued
that the Court’s embrace of a highly formal interpretation of the Equal
Protection Clause has signiﬁcantly undermined its effectiveness as a safeguard of substantive equality.31 One could put the point more strongly:
that the Court’s embrace of a formal rather than a substantive conception of equality has turned the Equal Protection Clause into a powerful
mechanism of disequalization: a tool that can be, and frequently is, used to
defend entrenched social hierarchies rather than to challenge them.32
A similar story can be told about the First Amendment. Although
the text of the First Amendment speaks only of liberty, not equality, since
the early twentieth century, the Court has recognized that implicit in the
guarantee of freedom of speech is a guarantee of expressive equality. It
has insisted, in other words, that freedom of speech means not only that
one possesses some quantum of liberty to speak but that one has the
same liberty to speak as do others. It has concluded, as a result, that the
government may not restrict speech unequally even when it might be able
to do so equally.33
The Court has interpreted the First Amendment to guarantee expressive equality because it has recognized that laws that treat speakers unequally threaten one of the First Amendment’s central purposes: namely,
ensuring that public debate on public matters is “uninhibited, robust, and
wide-open.”34 This is because when the government uses its coercive power
to advantage or disadvantage certain ideas or certain speakers, the effect
may be to drive some ideas out of the public realm altogether, thereby
diminishing the “uninhibited” and “wide-open” nature of the public debate.35
30. See Balkin & Siegel, supra note 18, at 11 (explaining that “depending on how the
Court dealt with . . . facially neutral practices with a disparate impact on racial minorities,
the Constitution would either rationalize or destabilize the practices that sustained the
racial stratiﬁcation of American society”).
31. For a strong articulation of this point, see Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No
Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 Stan. L. Rev.
1111, 1129 (1997); see also Ian Haney-López, Intentional Blindness, 87 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1779,
1877 (2012) (“Intentional blindness, as both doctrine and justificatory rhetoric, stands today
as a prelude to even more unjust racial politics.”).
32. This is obviously true of the affirmative action cases, but the same can also be said
of cases such as McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987), which validate the “equality”
provided by facially neutral laws. For a full account of this argument, see Randall L.
Kennedy, McCleskey v. Kemp : Race, Capital Punishment, and the Supreme Court, 101 Harv.
L. Rev. 1388, 1389 (1988).
33. This is the lesson from decisions such as Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 272
(1951), and Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 310 (1940), which struck down overly
discretionary licensing laws not because they restricted too much speech but because they
could be too easily used to discriminate.
34. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
35. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105,
116 (1991) (noting that discriminatory laws “raise[] the specter that the government may
effectively drive certain ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace”).
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Laws that deprive some speakers of expressive opportunities that others
possess, the Court has suggested, also insult the dignity of those they target
by implying—and sometimes outright declaring—that some ideas and
opinions are more valuable than others.36 Consequently, the Court has
insisted for decades now that the First Amendment guarantees not only
freedom of speech but also what Justice Marshall described in Police
Department of Chicago v. Mosley as “equality of status in the ﬁeld of ideas.”37
Like the guarantee of equal protection, the guarantee of “equality of
status in the ﬁeld of ideas” could obviously be interpreted in multiple
ways. It could be interpreted as a guarantee of substantive equality. That
is to say, it could be interpreted to mean that differently positioned members of the public enjoy roughly equal opportunity to express themselves
publicly. Alternatively, it could be interpreted more formally, to require—
but to require only—that the government not treat speakers differently
because of who they are or what they have to say.
For much of the twentieth century, the Court tended to employ the
ﬁrst, more substantive, conception of expressive equality. This is not to
say that the early- and mid-twentieth-century Court had no objection to
laws that subjected different speakers to different rules based on the content of their speech. To the contrary: In case after case, it made clear that
the government could not treat speakers unequally because it disliked
their message or their viewpoint. In most of these cases, however, the
groups targeted by the discriminatory speech laws were those at the
bottom of the political and social hierarchies: Jehovah’s Witnesses, for
example, or Communists.38 By prohibiting formally unequal treatment,
the Court also promoted substantive equality.
In other cases, the Court struck down laws that satisfied formal equality
(that is, they applied equally to all and were not motivated by discriminatory animus) but nevertheless imposed a much greater burden on the
expressive freedom of the poor and powerless than they imposed on others. In Martin v. City of Struthers, for example, the Court struck down a
36. Id. (asserting that “[t]he constitutional right of free expression is . . . intended to
remove governmental restraints from the arena of public discussion . . . in the belief that
no other approach would comport with the premise of individual dignity and choice upon
which our political system rests” (second alteration in original) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 448–49 (1991))); see also Elena Kagan,
Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in First Amendment
Doctrine, 63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 413, 511 (1996) (arguing by analogy to equal protection jurisprudence that discriminatory regulations of speech are impermissible because the government’s treatment of some speakers as “less intrinsically worthy . . . register[s] a kind of
disrespect that . . . renders [the regulations] improper”).
37. 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Alexander
Meiklejohn, Political Freedom: The Constitutional Powers of the People 27 (1948)).
38. See, e.g., Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 559 (1948); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310
U.S. 296, 300 (1940); Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242, 245 (1937); Stromberg v. California,
283 U.S. 359, 362 (1931).
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local ordinance that prohibited distributors of handbills and circulars
from ringing the doorbell or knocking on the door of any house in town
with the purpose of distributing their materials.39 It did so because it
found that the ordinance prohibited a mode of communication that played
a vital role in democratic politics—that was, in particular, “essential to
the poorly ﬁnanced causes of the little people”—without adequate justiﬁcation.40 In its heckler veto cases, meanwhile, the Court held that otherwise-constitutional breach of peace laws could not be used to penalize
those whose speech incited a hostile audience reaction, except when doing
so was absolutely necessary to preserve the peace.41 It did so because it
believed that any other rule would allow “standardization of ideas either
by legislatures, courts, or dominant political or community groups”—it would
allow those who possessed the power of the crowd (those who belonged to
locally “dominant . . . groups”) to use the instrumentalities of the government to silence those who lacked this power.42
In these and other cases, the Court recognized that even when the
government did not treat speakers differently because it disliked their
viewpoint or their identity, its actions could have a disparate impact on
the ability of some to communicate, given underlying inequalities in access
to expressive resources or social capital. It recognized, furthermore, that
this disparate impact, if sufficiently substantial, could violate the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech. This is a vision of the First Amendment
as the safeguard of more—and in some cases less—than formal equality.
Indeed, not only did the Court strike down formally neutral laws
that had a disparate effect on the ability of the “little people” to express
themselves; it also upheld formally unequal laws that, by treating different
speakers differently, attempted to compensate for differences in economic
39. 319 U.S. 141, 146 (1943).
40. Id.
41. See, e.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 551 (1965); Edwards v. South Carolina,
372 U.S. 229, 238 (1963); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37 (1949).
42. Terminiello, 337 U.S. at 4–5 (emphasis added). The Court deviated from this rule
once, in Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951), in an opinion that relied, ultimately, on a
formal equality argument. Indeed, the primary justiﬁcation the majority provided for why
the arrest and conviction of the unpopular speaker could be sustained in that case was that
“there was no evidence which could lend color to a claim that the acts of the police were a
cover for suppression of petitioner’s views and opinions.” Id. at 319–20. Because there was
no evidence that the government intended to discriminate against the speaker because of his
views, the Court concluded that the First Amendment was not offended. Justice Black
wrote a blistering dissent, in which he warned of the danger that the majority’s analysis posed
to the freedom of speech of unpopular speakers. See id. at 328–29 (Black, J., dissenting)
(“[T]oday’s holding means . . . minority speakers can be silenced . . . . Criticism of public
officials will be too dangerous for all but the most courageous. . . . [W]hile previous restraints probably cannot be imposed on an unpopular speaker, the police have discretion
to silence him as . . . the customary hostility to his views develops.”). In later years, the
Court largely heeded Black’s warnings and returned to the approach employed several
years before Feiner in Terminiello. See, e.g., Cox, 379 U.S. at 552; Edwards, 372 U.S. at 238.
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and political power. Perhaps the most famous instance of this is the decision in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC in 1967, about which I will say
more later.43 But also notable in this regard is the 1957 decision in United
States v. UAW-CIO, in which the Court refused to invalidate on First
Amendment grounds a section of the Taft–Hartley Act that prohibited
unions—but only unions—from spending money on election-related speech
in order to “protect the political process from . . . the corroding effect of
money employed in elections by aggregated power.”44
Here and elsewhere, the Court adopted what we might call, borrowing from the equal protection scholarship, an “antisubordinating” view
of the First Amendment. It did not always do so self-conﬁdently or with
great clarity. In fact, at times, the Court appeared entirely unable to explain
why it was interpreting the First Amendment as it did. In UAW-CIO, for
example, Justice Frankfurter’s majority opinion elaborated at great
length on the history of campaign finance regulation in the United States
but was entirely unable to explain why the ban on union spending did
not violate the First Amendment.45 It is not hard to understand, however.
If the purpose of the First Amendment is to foster “the widest possible
dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources”—as
the Court declared it to be in Associated Press v. United States in 194546 and
would reiterate on many occasions subsequently—then laws that restrict the
expressive activity of powerful actors in order to foster participation from
less powerful, but potentially more numerous, more diverse, and more
antagonistic others do not necessarily threaten First Amendment values;
instead, they may help promote them.47 This is certainly what the opinion
in Associated Press suggested.48
That Frankfurter was unwilling to endorse this view of the First
Amendment, explicitly at least, suggests how difficult at least some members
43. 395 U.S. 367 (1969); see also infra notes 150–159 and accompanying text.
44. 352 U.S. 567, 582 (1957).
45. Instead, after a lengthy discussion of the pressing concerns that motivated
Congress to regulate campaign spending, Frankfurter argued that the Court neither
needed to nor should analyze the constitutional issues raised by the case and noted some
of the questions that it might address on future occasions. Id. at 591–92. The questions
Frankfurter listed strongly suggested, however, that he believed that the ban could be
proﬁtably challenged only as applied, rather than facially, though he did not explain why
this might be. See id. at 592 (noting as questions that might proﬁtably be explored on
future occasions: “Did it constitute active electioneering or simply state the record of
particular candidates on economic issues? Did the union sponsor the broadcast with the
intent to affect the results of the election?”).
46. 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945).
47. For later iterations of the claim made in Associated Press, see CBS. v. Democratic
Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 183 (1973); Citizen Publ’g Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131,
139 (1969); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964).
48. Associated Press, 326 U.S. at 20 (“Freedom of the press from governmental interference under the First Amendment does not sanction repression of that freedom by private interests.”).
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of the Court found the antisubordinating approach when what it entailed
were constraints on private speech. It was well and good to say that the
government could not regulate speech when doing so had a disparate
impact on the expressive freedom of the “little people.” It was quite another
thing, however, to say that the expressive freedom of powerful private actors
could be curtailed when doing so made it easier for other, less powerful
speakers to express themselves. Taken to its logical extreme, this principle
called into question the distinction between public and private power that
is a constitutive feature of the modern First Amendment tradition.49
Yet, notwithstanding the evident discomfort that some members of
the Court demonstrated toward the broader implications of the antisubordinating view, in the decades after UAW-CIO was handed down, the
Court repeatedly upheld laws that compensated for inequalities in social,
political, and economic power by limiting the expressive freedom of
powerful private speakers.50 More generally, it crafted a free speech jurisprudence that was sensitive to economic and political inequality—that
assessed the constitutionality of state action by examining the context in
which it operated, and its effects, as well as its motivations and its form.
Beginning in the 1970s, however, the Court turned away from this
power- and context-sensitive approach to the interpretation of freedom of
speech. In many different areas of law, it began to insist—in contrast to
the earlier cases—that the First Amendment poses little bar to wellintentioned government actions that have a disparate impact on the ability
of some to communicate.51 It has instead interpreted the First Amendment
to prohibit—and, for the most part, to prohibit only—government actions
that treat some speakers differently because of the viewpoint or subject
matter of their speech, or because of other “suspect” characteristics, such
as their institutional identity or their wealth.52
The result has been to limit the effectiveness of the First Amendment
as a tool for protecting the expressive freedom of those at the bottom of
the economic and social hierarchies—those whose speech is most likely
to be constrained by forces other than the discriminatory animus of
government actors. It has also turned the First Amendment into a barrier
to legislative efforts to protect the expressive freedom of the (relatively)
poor and (relatively) powerless by limiting the expressive freedom of the
richer and more powerful.

49. See infra notes 138–140 and accompanying text.
50. One can include on this list, besides Red Lion and UAW-CIO, NRLB v. Gissel
Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 616 (1969), which I discuss below. See infra notes 183–186 and
accompanying text.
51. See infra notes 57–60 and accompanying text.
52. See infra notes 68–74 and accompanying text.
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Campaign Finance Regulation

This is most obviously true when it comes to the Court’s campaign
ﬁnance jurisprudence. Campaign ﬁnance regulation in the United States
has always been justiﬁed, in whole or in part, by a desire to promote a
rough kind of substantive equality in the market for political inﬂuence.53
By limiting the amount of money that can be spent on election-related
speech, campaign ﬁnance laws attempt to ensure that the wealthy and
the not so wealthy have at least somewhat equal opportunity to use money
to influence both who is elected and how they govern once elected. Campaign finance has tended to promote this goal, however, by restricting the
spending of only certain kinds of political actors—corporations, for example, and unions. Even when they apply a formally neutral rule, campaign
finance laws uniquely burden the wealthy and are intended to do so.
For decades now, critics have argued that the fact that they intentionally burden only some speakers and not others means that campaign
ﬁnance laws violate the First Amendment. Justice Douglas wrote a vigorous dissent in UAW-CIO in which he argued that the majority should have
struck down the ban on union campaign spending on First Amendment
grounds.54 Douglas adamantly rejected the argument that the ban could
be justiﬁed by the need to prevent unions from using their considerable
economic power to exert an “undue and disproportionate influence upon
federal elections.”55 Douglas argued that the fact that “one group or
another . . . is too powerful,” like the fact that one group or another “advocates unpopular ideas,” cannot constitutionally justify preventing it from
speaking or expending money on speech.56
Until the early 2000s, this argument utterly failed to convince the
Court that campaign finance laws necessarily violated the First Amendment—
or even that that they did so in most cases. Although the Court acknowledged that constitutional interests were implicated when the government
limited how much corporations or unions could spend on election-related
speech, it insisted that “considerable deference” be given to the legislative
53. As early as the late nineteenth century, reformers argued that legislation was
necessary to prevent wealth—particularly corporate wealth—from undermining the ability
of the nonwealthy to influence politics. This sentiment was vigorously expressed by statesman
Elihu Root in a 1894 speech that proved inﬂuential to the Court’s mid-twentieth-century
campaign ﬁnance jurisprudence. See United States v. UAW-CIO, 352 U.S. 567, 571 (1957)
(“The idea [behind campaign ﬁnance restrictions] is to prevent . . . the great railroad
companies, the great insurance companies, the great telephone companies, the great
aggregations of wealth from using their corporate funds . . . to send members of the
legislature . . . to vote for their protection and the advancement of their interests . . . .” (second
alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Elihu Root, Addresses on
Government and Citizenship 143 (Robert Bacon & James Brown Scott eds., 1916))).
54. See UAW-CIO, 352 U.S. at 597 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
55. Brief for the United States at 51, 52–57, UAW-CIO, 352 U.S. 567 (No. 44), 1956
WL 89052.
56. See UAW-CIO, 352 U.S. at 597 (Douglas, J., dissenting).

2018]

AN ANTISUBORDINATING FIRST AMENDMENT

2129

judgment that “the particular legal and economic attributes of corporations and labor organizations” justify their “particularly careful regulation.”57
This deference was not unlimited. In Buckley v. Valeo, the Court held that
the government could not enact campaign finance laws in order to “equaliz[e] the relative ability of individuals and groups to influence the outcome
of elections.”58 “[T]he concept that government may restrict the speech of
some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of
others,” the Court asserted, “is wholly foreign to the First Amendment.”59
Instead, the government had to demonstrate that campaign ﬁnance laws
furthered some other, more compelling interest, such as the interest in preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption.60 It also had to show
that the laws were “closely drawn” to advance those ends.61
In later cases the Court interpreted this standard relatively loosely.62
And notwithstanding Buckley’s evident discomfort with the substantiveequality-promoting aspects of campaign finance law, the Court subsequently interpreted the government’s interest in preventing political corruption broadly, to include efforts to prevent the “corrosive and distorting
effects of immense aggregations of wealth . . . accumulated with the help of
the corporate form” from undermining the integrity of the democratic
political process.63 In effect, the Court defined the anticorruption interest
to include an interest in promoting equality.64 One can well understand
why. As Professor David Strauss has argued, corruption is a serious concern
in the campaign finance context largely because of the significant economic
inequality that characterizes American society.65 It is only in a context in
which economic resources are unevenly distributed that the ability of some
voters to use those resources to buy political influence poses a serious
57. FEC v. Nat’l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 209–10 (1982).
58. 424 U.S. 1, 48 (1976) (per curiam).
59. Id. at 48–49.
60. See id. at 25–27.
61. Id. at 25.
62. See Richard L. Hasen, Rethinking the Unconstitutionality of Contribution and
Expenditure Limits in Ballot Measure Campaigns, 78 S. Cal. L. Rev. 885, 891 (2005) (discussing the four post-Buckley cases—which he called the “New Deference Quartet”—in
which the Court “markedly lowered the bar for upholding the constitutionality of campaign ﬁnance regulations in candidate campaigns”).
63. Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990), overruled by
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); see also FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc.,
479 U.S. 238, 257 (1986) (describing the desire to “regulate the ‘substantial aggregations
of wealth amassed by the special advantages which go with the corporate form of
organization’” as an anticorruption interest (quoting FEC v. Nat’l Right to Work Comm.,
459 U.S. 197, 207 (1982))).
64. David A. Strauss, Corruption, Equality, and Campaign Finance Reform, 94
Colum. L. Rev. 1369, 1369 n.1 (1994).
65. Id. at 1370 (arguing that corruption in the campaign ﬁnance context “is a derivative problem” and that “[i]f somehow an appropriate level of equality were achieved,
much of the reason to be concerned about corruption would no longer exist”).
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threat to the representativeness of the system writ large. This means that a
constitutional rule that recognizes, as Buckley did, that the government has
a compelling interest in combating corruption because of the threat that
corruption poses to “the integrity of our system of representative democracy” can easily be interpreted to mean that the government also has a
compelling interest in combatting the inﬂuence of money on politics.66
Certainly this is how the Court in later cases interpreted the Buckley rule.
The result was that, notwithstanding its strict language, in practice Buckley
was not interpreted as an insurmountable constraint on the government’s ability to limit the campaign spending of the very wealthy.67
And then Citizens United v. FEC came along.68 In that decision, the
Court famously—perhaps infamously—held that the government’s interest in safeguarding elections from the corrupting and “distorting” effects
of corporate wealth not only wasn’t compelling; it wasn’t even legitimate.69
Instead, the Court held that the government had a compelling interest in
preventing only quid pro quo corruption—the exchange of money for
speciﬁc favors—and its appearance.70 “The fact that speakers may have
influence over or access to elected officials does not mean that th[o]se
officials are corrupt,” Justice Kennedy asserted for the Court.71 The Court
also held that the government could not impose greater restrictions on
corporate speech than on the speech of natural individuals.72 This is
because, the Court explained, when the government “tak[es] the right to
speak from some and giv[es] it to others, [it] deprives the disadvantaged
person or class of the right to use speech to strive to establish worth, standing, and respect for the speaker’s voice.”73 It deprives the disadvantaged
speakers, in other words, of “equality of status in the ﬁeld of ideas.”74
66. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26–27 (1976) (per curiam).
67. See, e.g., McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 203 (2003) (“Since our decision in
Buckley, Congress’ power to prohibit corporations and unions from using funds in their
treasuries to ﬁnance advertisements expressly advocating the election or defeat of candidates in federal elections has been ﬁrmly embedded in our law.”), overruled by Citizens
United, 558 U.S. 310; Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 391–92 (2000) (“While
Buckley’s evidentiary showing exempliﬁes a sufficient justiﬁcation for contribution limits, it
does not speak to what may be necessary as a minimum.”).
68. 558 U.S. 310.
69. Id. at 348–50.
70. Id. at 359 (“The hallmark of corruption is the ﬁnancial quid pro quo: dollars for
political favors[.]” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting FEC v. Nat’l Conservative
Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 497 (1985))).
71. Id.
72. Id. at 356 (overruling Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990),
on the grounds that the First Amendment prevents “the Government [from] suppress[ing]
political speech on the basis of the speaker’s corporate identity”).
73. Id. at 340–41.
74. Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Alexander Meiklejohn, Political Freedom: The Constitutional Powers of
the People 27 (1948)).
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In an article published shortly after the decision was handed down,
Professor Kathleen Sullivan argued that the majority opinion in Citizens
United reflected the triumph of a libertarian, as opposed to an egalitarian,
conception of the First Amendment guarantee of freedom of speech.75
But in fact the central value the opinion vindicated was equality, not liberty.
As Justice Stevens pointed out in his dissent, the “basic premise underlying the Court’s ruling [was] its iteration, and constant reiteration, of the
proposition that the First Amendment bars regulatory distinctions based
on a speaker’s identity.”76 Indeed, the Court did not hold that the government could never restrict election-related speech. It merely held that the
government could not restrict election-related speech in order to promote certain voices over others. It could not enact campaign-finance laws,
in other words, to advance what the Court clearly considered to be a discriminatory aim (that is, reducing the political inﬂuence of the wealthy).
Nor could it use discriminatory—that is, speaker-based—means of advancing its legitimate aims.77 Indeed, the Court insisted that the government
could employ speaker distinctions only when doing so was necessary to the
functioning of government institutions.78
What Citizens United demonstrates, therefore, is less a shift toward a
libertarian conception of freedom of speech than a shift in the Court’s
understanding of what an egalitarian First Amendment requires. In lieu
of the more contextual approach it had previously taken, the Court now
insisted on a much more formal equality rule: one that not only prevented the government from employing speaker-based distinctions when
it regulated political spending but also deﬁned the government’s
anticorruption interest so narrowly as to prevent the enforcement of
even many non-speaker-based laws that were intended to limit the influence of wealth on politics.79 The result was a significant increase in
spending on election campaigns—much of it coming from wealthy donors.80
The Court’s recent campaign ﬁnance jurisprudence thus provides a
stark illustration of how the insistence on formal equality can actively
75. Sullivan, supra note 8, at 145.
76. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 394 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
77. Id. at 340 (“Premised on mistrust of governmental power, the First Amendment . . .
[p]rohibit[s] . . . restrictions distinguishing among different speakers, allowing speech by
some but not others.”).
78. Id. at 341 (“The Court has upheld a narrow class of speech restrictions that operate to the disadvantage of certain persons, but these rulings were based on an interest in
allowing governmental entities to perform . . . functions . . . [that] cannot operate without some
restrictions on particular kinds of speech.”).
79. See Michael S. Kang, The End of Campaign Finance Law, 98 Va. L. Rev. 1, 5
(2012).
80. See, e.g., Bob Biersack, 8 Years Later: How Citizens United Changed Campaign
Finance, Open Secrets (Feb. 7, 2018), https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2018/02/howcitizens-united-changed-campaign-finance/ [https://perma.cc/V955-EVE7] (documenting the
growing inﬂuence of outside spending relative to total federal campaign spending).
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interfere with the government’s ability to promote substantive equality—
in this case, substantive equality of opportunity in the market for political
inﬂuence. The law of campaign ﬁnance is not, however, the only area of
First Amendment law in which the Court has embraced a much more
formal conception of expressive equality than was previously the case,
with similarly problematic consequences. Instead, the shift evident in
Citizens United can be espied in many different areas of free speech doctrine.
B.

Time, Place, and Manner Cases

Consider, for example, the body of First Amendment cases dealing
with laws that regulate the time, place, or manner of speech. For over
seventy years, the Court has recognized that the government may restrict
when, where, and how individuals express themselves publicly, so long as
the restrictions it imposes serve a legitimate—that is, noncensorial—purpose, are reasonably limited, and do not “unfair[ly] discriminat[e]” against
any particular group or individual.81 Over time, however, the Court has
interpreted the prohibition against discriminatory time, place, and
manner laws in markedly different ways.
Originally, the Court interpreted the antidiscrimination principle to
mean that the government could not enact a time, place, or manner law
if doing so made it signiﬁcantly harder for a particular subset of speakers
to express themselves publicly. In Martin v. Struthers, the Court struck
down a ban on the door-to-door distribution of pamphlets because it
found that being able to distribute pamphlets door-to-door was crucial to
the “poorly ﬁnanced causes of little people.”82 In the hotly contested
license-tax cases it decided around the same time, members of the Court
bitterly divided over whether the government could ever impose license
taxes on expressive activity; however, all nine Justices agreed that the
Court could not impose license fees that were too steep for some to pay.83
In these and other cases, the Court made clear that laws that regulated the time, place, or manner of speech were constitutional only if they
left open what it later described as “ample alternative channels” for affected
parties to communicate.84 The Court also insisted that the government’s
81. Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 576 (1941) (“If a municipality has authority
to control the use of its public streets for parades or processions, as it undoubtedly has, it
cannot be denied authority to give consideration, without unfair discrimination, to time,
place and manner in relation to the other proper uses of the streets.”).
82. 319 U.S. 141, 146 (1943).
83. See, e.g., Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 111 (1943) (“Freedom of
speech, freedom of the press, freedom of religion are available to all, not merely to those
who can pay their own way.”); Jones v. City of Opelika, 319 U.S. 103, 134–35 (1943)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (arguing that license taxes should be considered constitutional unless so large as to be “oppressive in their effect upon [expressive] activities”).
84. See, e.g., Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 771 (1976) (“Whatever may be the proper bounds of time, place, and manner
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justiﬁcations for regulating the time, place, and manner of speech had to
be closely scrutinized to ensure that the real motivations for the law were
not, in fact, a desire to suppress disfavored messages or—equally problematic—unsubstantiated stereotypes about those they regulated.85
The Court did not always enforce these requirements very rigorously.86 And by the 1980s, it had almost entirely stopped enforcing them.87
Although in theory, the government continued to have to demonstrate
that its regulations left open ample alternative channels of communication and represented a narrowly tailored response to an empirically
veriﬁable problem, in practice, the Court tended to be “extraordinarily
lenient” when determining whether these requirements were satisﬁed.88
It focused its analysis of the constitutionality of time, place, and manner
laws instead on an orthogonal question: Namely, was the law in question
“content-based” or “content-neutral”? In other words, did the law restrict
speech because of its content or because of some other characteristic
(for example, its location or its volume)? If the former, the Court struck
the law down unless the government was able to show that it served a
compelling interest by the least restrictive means possible.89 If the latter,
the Court often applied very deferential scrutiny.90
In effect, the Court redeﬁned what it means to say that a time, place,
or manner law discriminates. No longer did the discrimination inquiry
turn on an analysis of the law’s effects or the substantiality of its justiﬁcations; what mattered instead were the formal distinctions the government
restrictions on commercial speech, they are plainly exceeded by this Virginia statute,
which singles out speech of a particular content and seeks to prevent its dissemination
completely.”).
85. Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 100–01 (1972) (striking down a picketing law that prohibited nonlabor pickets after ﬁnding no evidence that nonlabor speech
was, as the government claimed, categorically more likely to result in disruption than labor
speech). For more discussion of this point, see Lakier, supra note 28, at 287–89.
86. See Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 46, 50
(1987) (“The Court does not seriously inquire into the substantiality of the governmental
interest, and it does not seriously examine the alternative means by which the government
could achieve its objectives. As a result, when the Court applies this standard, it invariably
upholds the challenged restriction.”).
87. The one, notable exception to this general rule is the 1994 decision in Ladue v.
Gilleo, which struck down a local ordinance that banned lawn signs because it provided
insufficient alternatives for impacted citizens to communicate, particularly when they were
“persons of modest means or limited mobility.” 512 U.S. 43, 57 (1994). The fact that the
ordinance threatened the rights of homeowners—that is, property owners—may help
explain the unusual rigor of the Court’s analysis.
88. Robert Post, Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, 47 Stan. L. Rev. 1249, 1263
(1995).
89. United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000).
90. Leslie Kendrick, Content Discrimination Revisited, 98 Va. L. Rev. 231, 237 (2012)
(“[C]ontent-neutral laws receive what the Court calls ‘intermediate scrutiny,’ in practice a
highly deferential form of review which virtually all laws pass.” (quoting Turner Broad.
Sys., Inc. (Turner II ) v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 189 (1997))).
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employed and the legislative purposes that motivated the law. The consequence was, as in the campaign ﬁnance cases, to transform the guarantee
of expressive equality into a guarantee of formal equality rather than
something more substantive. So long as the government did not intend
to suppress speech because of its content or employ an explicitly contentbased distinction, the Court found that it could constitutionally deprive
those it regulated of any realistic opportunity to express themselves.91 It
also could regulate on the basis of largely unsubstantiated apprehensions
of harm.92
The result was in some respects the opposite of the result in the campaign ﬁnance cases: It made it easier for the government to justify regulations that had the effect of limiting certain speakers’ speech but not others’.
But the mechanism was the same. Just as was true of its campaign finance
cases, in its time, place, and manner cases, the Court now focused its analysis of the constitutionality of a given law almost entirely on the nature of
the relationship it established between the government and the speaker
rather than the context in which it operated or its effects.
The consequence of this transformation in the time, place, and manner
cases was to make it significantly more difficult for litigants to use the First
Amendment to challenge regulations that imposed a disparate burden
on their ability to communicate publicly—at least when those regulations
did not happen to take a content-based form. Consider in this respect
the 1984 decision in Members of the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent.93
The case involved a Los Angeles ordinance that absolutely prohibited the
posting of signs on public property anywhere in the city.94 The plaintiffs—a
group who wanted to put up signs to support an (ultimately unsuccessful)
candidate for City Council—argued that the ordinance was unconstitutional because it restricted too much speech and did so to further an insufficiently weighty purpose: namely, the elimination of “visual clutter” in

91. See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (“A regulation
that serves purposes unrelated to the content of expression is deemed neutral, even if it
has an incidental effect on some speakers or messages but not others.”); City of Renton v.
Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 54 (1986) (concluding that a zoning law that applied
to adult movie theatres left open ample channels of communication even though it left
only ﬁve percent of city territory zoned for the theatres, none of which included—according to the Court of Appeals—any “commercially viable” land).
92. For example, in Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, the Court upheld a
Park Service regulation that prevented protestors from sleeping in two national parks
because the regulation reasonably advanced the government’s interest in administrative
efficiency and would “limit the wear and tear on park properties.” 468 U.S. 288, 297–99
(1984). The majority reached this conclusion notwithstanding the fact that the government provided no evidence that allowing protestors to sleep in the park would present
administrative problems or meaningfully increase wear and tear. Id. at 310–11 (Marshall,
J., dissenting).
93. 466 U.S. 789 (1984).
94. Id. at 791–92.
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the city.95 The Ninth Circuit agreed and struck the ordinance down, but
the Supreme Court reversed. The Court acknowledged that in the past it
“ha[d] shown special solicitude for forms of expression [such as signs]
that are much less expensive than feasible alternatives and hence may be
important to a large segment of the citizenry.”96 It nevertheless upheld
the ordinance because it found there to be “not even a hint of bias or
censorship in [its] enactment or enforcement” and that those affected by
the ordinance could still communicate their messages by other means—
for example, by posting signs on private property or by using handbills.97
In fact, though, as Justice Brennan pointed out in dissent, the alternative
channels of communication the Court pointed to were far from “ample”
and far from adequate as alternatives.98 After all, not everyone has access
to private property on which to post.99 Meanwhile, handbilling is a far
more labor-intensive and expensive form of communication than the posting of signs.100 The result of the Court’s holding was therefore to make it
much more difficult for poorly funded political groups like the plaintiffs
to make use of a “critical [and inexpensive] . . . means of communication.”101
Vincent demonstrates the danger to expressive interests posed by the
formalism of the Court’s approach to the discrimination inquiry in its
time, place, and manner cases. It makes clear how a First Amendment
analysis that focuses—to the exclusion of almost all else—on the question
of whether state action is motivated by discriminatory animus, or takes a
content-based form, can end up rubberstamping what are in fact highly
repressive speech policies. In fact, this type of analysis prevents courts
from taking seriously the possibility that government officials might have
“strong incentives to overregulate even in the absence of an intent to
censor particular views.”102
C.

Public Employee Speech

Consider one ﬁnal example of the Court’s formalist shift: the publicemployee speech cases. Until 2006, courts faced with First Amendment
challenges involving the speech of government employees resolved these
95. Id. at 795–96.
96. Id. at 812 n.30. The Court noted, however, that “this solicitude has practical boundaries.” Id.
97. Id. at 804, 812.
98. Id. at 819–20 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
99. Id. at 820.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 819.
102. This is the case, Justice Marshall argued, because of the political realities of government. Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 315 (1984) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the “incentive [to overregulate] stems from the fact that . . . the
political power of [the general public] is likely to be far greater than that [of those who
seek to use a particular forum for First Amendment activity]”).
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challenges by applying the Pickering balancing test—so named for the
Warren Court decision in which the test was ﬁrst applied.103 The test
allowed the government to discipline employee speech when its interest
“in promoting the efficiency of . . . public services” outweighed the employee’s constitutionally protected interest “in commenting upon matters
of public concern.”104 Although the Pickering test allowed the government,
when acting as employer, to restrict signiﬁcantly more speech than it
could when acting as sovereign, it prohibited the government from sanctioning employee speech merely because it disliked it or believed that it
cast the government into disrepute. Private employers, of course, were
not so limited. Nevertheless, because the Court recognized that a major
purpose of the First Amendment is to “protect the free discussion of
governmental affairs”—including the free discussion of “the manner in
which government is operated or should be operated”—the Pickering test
did not grant government employers the same freedom.105 The doctrine
recognized, in other words, the important institutional differences that
distinguished government employers from private employers.
It did so, that is, until 2006, when, in Garcetti v. Ceballos, the Court
significantly limited the reach of the Pickering test.106 In that case, a majority of Justices on the Court—in fact, the same Justices who signed on to
Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Citizens United—held that Pickering does not
apply when employees speak pursuant to their official duties because such
speech is categorically beyond the scope of First Amendment concern.107
The arguments the Court provided to explain why such speech is
not entitled to constitutional protection are not very persuasive. Justice
Kennedy, who wrote the opinion for the Court, just as he did in Citizens
United, argued that the exemption of such speech from constitutional protection was necessary to promote the efficiency of government services.108
But of course, Pickering already required courts to consider the government’s interest in the efficient provision of services and to honor it when
that interest outweighed the free speech interests at stake.109
Justice Kennedy also argued that limiting constitutional protection
for employee speech made pursuant to official duties was necessary to
prevent excessive judicial intervention into the inner workings of the government.110 In theory, perhaps. And yet judges had had nearly forty years
103. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
104. Id. at 568.
105. Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966).
106. 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
107. Id. at 421.
108. Id. at 418 (“Government employers, like private employers, need a significant degree
of control over their employees’ words and actions [because] without it, there would be
little chance for the efficient provision of public services.”).
109. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568.
110. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 423.
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between the articulation of the Pickering balancing test and its constriction
in Garcetti to intrusively intervene into the government workplace if they
wanted to. There was no evidence that they had taken the opportunity to
do so. Instead, by all accounts, judicial review of government-employee
cases, including on-the-job speech cases, tended to be quite deferential.111
Finally, Justice Kennedy argued that Pickering need not apply to
speech made pursuant to an employee’s official duties because when the
employer disciplines the employee for that speech, the employer “does
not infringe any liberties the employee might have enjoyed as a private
citizen” but simply “exercise[s] . . . control over what the employer itself
has commissioned or created.”112 This, too, is unpersuasive as an explanation for the change. After all, as the Court acknowledged, the Pickering
test was not intended to protect only the individual employee’s rights. It
was also intended to protect “the public’s interest in receiving the wellinformed views of government employees engaging in civic discussion.”113
For the public, it should make no difference if the employee’s speech
occurs pursuant to a job-related duty; the only thing that should matter is
whether it touches on a genuine matter of public concern.
The only persuasive explanation for the change Garcetti wrought to
public-employee speech doctrine is one that is not explicit in the text but
suggested throughout it: namely, that in limiting the scope of the Pickering
test, the Court sought to place government employers on a roughly equal
footing with private employers vis-à-vis their employees. As Professor
Kermit Roosevelt notes, public-employee speech doctrine has always
“attempt[ed] to promote two different kinds of equality simultaneously”:114
First, the Court wants to promote equality between government
and private employers with respect to control over the workplace
and employee performance: The government employer should
have managerial authority that at least resembles that of the
private employer. Second, it wants to maintain equality between
government employees and other citizens: Government
employees should not be worse off in constitutional terms,
namely, they should not be required to surrender their First
Amendment rights as a condition of public employment.115

111. See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Workplace Harassment, 39
UCLA L. Rev. 1791, 1820 n.130 (1992) (noting that “[t]he government as employer can
ban even political discussions by its employees if they ‘disrupt[] the work of the office,’ or
‘discredit[] the office’ before the public, or ‘demonstrate[] a character trait that [makes
the speakers] unﬁt to perform [their] work’” (quoting Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378,
389 (1987))).
112. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421–22.
113. Id. at 419.
114. Kermit Roosevelt III, Not as Bad as You Think: Why Garcetti v. Ceballos Makes
Sense, 14 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 631, 633 (2012).
115. Id.
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Pickering reconciled these competing interests by means of a balancing test. Garcetti does so by establishing a bright-line rule that grants government employers the same total authority to discipline employees for
their job-related speech that private employers have traditionally possessed.
The opinion thus articulates what we might think of as an equality
principle—albeit one that is in many respects the inverse of the equality
principle articulated in Citizens United. If Citizens United stands for the
proposition that the government has no right to distinguish between private actors when it regulates the public sphere,116 Garcetti stands for the
proposition that the government enjoys the same right as private employers to control what occurs in the (now quasi-private) institutions it operates.
These propositions are complementary. Indeed, the logic of Garcetti
explains the Court’s conclusion in Citizens United that, although speakerbased distinctions are not permitted when the government regulates the
public forum, they are permitted when it regulates its own institutions.
But if the one rule empowers private actors, the other does the reverse.
In both cases, however, the principle operates by ignoring important
economic, political, or—in this case—institutional differences between
the groups it equates for purposes of First Amendment analysis. Here, as
elsewhere, the consequence has been to limit litigants’ ability to use the
First Amendment as a tool for challenging entrenched power. Indeed, in
the ten or so years since Garcetti was handed down, courts have routinely
denied protection to whistleblowing employees who bring governmental
misconduct to light.117
Garcetti and Citizens United demonstrate the problem with conceiving
of the Court’s recent free speech jurisprudence as libertarian. In both
opinions, the interest that informs the analysis is not liberty but equality.
Further, the Court conceptualizes that interest formally rather than substantively—that is to say, by focusing almost exclusively on the nature of
the relationship between the government and the speaker rather than
the context in which the speech occurs or the effects of the government’s
actions on the broader speech environment. What both opinions make
visible, in other words, is a commitment to formal equality that in practice
frequently redounds to the beneﬁt of those with power. This is not surprising. After all, a conception of equality that requires the government
116. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 394 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (“The basic premise underlying the Court’s ruling is its iteration,
and constant reiteration, of the proposition that the First Amendment bars regulatory
distinctions based on a speaker’s identity, including its ‘identity’ as a corporation.”).
117. Helen Norton has documented the effects of Garcetti on whistleblowers in a number of recent articles. See, e.g., Helen Norton, Constraining Public Employee Speech:
Government’s Control of Its Workers’ Speech to Protect Its Own Expression, 59 Duke L.J.
1, 4–5 (2009) (“Courts’ unblinking deference . . . allows government officials to punish,
and thus deter, whistleblowing.”); Helen Norton, Shining a Light on Democracy’s Dark
Lagoon, 61 S.C. L. Rev. 535, 546 (2010).
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to treat the powerful and the powerless alike provides powerful speakers
(including powerful government speakers) tremendous opportunity to
use their economic and political resources not only to promote their own
views but also to limit the ability of others to express theirs. For those
committed to a view of the First Amendment as a check on—rather than
a handmaiden to—power, this state of affairs is deeply troubling.
II. THE ANTISUBORDINATING FIRST AMENDMENT THAT WAS
The good news is that things have been, and therefore could again
be, different. As the previous Part suggests, the tendency of contemporary free speech law to reinforce rather than combat existing inequalities
in wealth and power is the product of a relatively recent shift in the
Court’s conception of what it means to guarantee “equality of status in
the ﬁeld of ideas,”118 not an inevitable feature of the modern First
Amendment tradition. Earlier cases—even the relatively restricted
sample of cases resolved by the Supreme Court—sometimes applied a
substantially different approach to the First Amendment analysis than
the approach courts take today. This is true not only of the three areas of
free speech law canvassed in the previous Part, although it is certainly
true of those areas. But in other areas of First Amendment
jurisprudence, as well, one can discern in the older cases an often
signiﬁcantly different understanding of what it means to guarantee
freedom of speech: one much more willing to take into account
inequalities in economic and political power and much more sensitive to
the disparate effects that formally neutral and well-intentioned laws can
have on the ability of the “little people” to communicate.
These earlier cases suggest what an antisubordinating First Amendment
might look like. They also make clear what the previous Part already
hinted at: namely, that the regressive tendencies of contemporary First
Amendment law cannot solely, or even primarily, be blamed on the “imperial” or libertarian tendencies of the Roberts Court—that is to say, on
its tendency to interpret the guarantee of freedom of speech too expansively and rigorously. This is because, as they show, our contemporary
First Amendment is in many respects not very expansive and not always
very rigorous. It is in many respects much narrower and much weaker
than the First Amendment that existed fifty years ago—at least with respect
to certain kinds of free speech claims (those that push against, rather
than reinforce, property rights). What this suggests is that the answer to the
ills that beset contemporary free speech law is not less constitutional
protection for speech but a different kind of constitutional protection:
one that reduces, rather than reinforces, the inequalities in expressive
118. Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Alexander Meiklejohn, Political Freedom: The Constitutional Powers of
the People 27 (1948)).
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opportunity that are a consequence of the highly, and increasingly,
unequal distribution of economic and political power in the United States.
A.

Speech on Private Property

To see the far-from-imperial nature of contemporary free speech
jurisprudence, one need only look at the cases involving First Amendment
rights of access to private property. Today, speakers have virtually no federal constitutional right of access to privately owned spaces, like shopping
malls.119 The only exception to this general rule is when the private property owner exercises “powers traditionally exclusively reserved to the State.”120
This was not always the rule, however. In Marsh v. Alabama, the Court
held that a state trespass law could not constitutionally be used to exclude
a Jehovah’s Witness who wished to distribute religious literature on the
sidewalks of a company-owned town.121 Two decades later, in Amalgamated
Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., the Court similarly
concluded that state courts could not constitutionally enjoin members of
a union from picketing a store located in a privately owned shopping mall.122
Today, these cases are usually celebrated—or derided—for establishing (in the case of Marsh) or extending (in the case of Logan Valley) the
principle that when a private actor performs a sufficiently important governmental function, it occupies the role of a state actor for constitutional
purposes.123 The Court has repeatedly encouraged this framing.124 However,
it represents a signiﬁcant distortion of what the opinions actually say.

119. See Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 521 (1976) (holding that the “constitutional
guarantee of free expression has no part to play” in cases involving rights of access to private property).
120. Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352 (1974).
121. 326 U.S. 501, 509–10 (1946).
122. 391 U.S. 308, 319–20 (1968), overruled by Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
During this period, lower courts also found that speakers possessed a First Amendment
right of access to migrant labor camps, as well as to certain portions of their employer’s
property. See, e.g., NLRB v. Lake Superior Lumber Corp., 167 F.2d 147, 150–51 (6th Cir.
1948); Folgueras v. Hassle, 331 F. Supp. 615, 623 (W.D. Mich. 1971); People v. Rewald, 318
N.Y.S.2d 40, 45–46 (Cty. Ct. 1971).
123. See, e.g., Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. Rev.
543, 578 n.131 (2000) (noting Marsh as the ﬁrst application of the public-function test for
state action); Frederick F. Schauer, Hudgens v. NLRB and the Problem of State Action in
First Amendment Adjudication, 61 Minn. L. Rev. 433, 453–55 (1977) (criticizing Logan
Valley for extending the governmental-function test too far).
124. When citing Marsh, this is invariably how the Court describes its holding. See,
e.g., Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 621–22 (1991) (describing Marsh
as standing for the proposition that state action applies when “the actor is performing a
traditional governmental function”); Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 562 (1972)
(ﬁnding that Marsh “simply held that where private interests were substituting for and
performing the customary functions of government, First Amendment freedoms could not
be denied where exercised in the customary manner on the town’s sidewalks and streets”).
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In fact, neither decision depended on the conclusion that the private property owner occupied the role of state actor. To the contrary, the
Court assumed in both cases that it was the judicial enforcement of a state
property law that satisﬁed the First Amendment’s state action requirement, not the actions of the private property owner.125 What both decisions depended on instead was ﬁnding that the private property at issue
served an important “public function”—and did so for the economic
beneﬁt of its owner.126 What this meant, the Court concluded in both
cases, was that the owner’s property rights had “become circumscribed by
the statutory and constitutional rights of those who use[d its property].”127
In holding as much, the Court in some senses merely extended a
principle it developed in a series of early-twentieth-century cases dealing
with speech on publicly owned streets, parks, and sidewalks: namely, that
when it comes to spaces that serve as important sites of public expression
(what would come to be known as “public forums”), the public’s right of
access outweighs the right of the property owner to exclude.128 But it also
pushed strongly against a formalist conception of the First Amendment
equality guarantee. After all, in neither case was there any suggestion that
125. In his majority opinion in Marsh, Justice Black framed the issue raised by the case
as “whether a State, consistently with the First and Fourteenth Amendments, can impose
criminal punishment on a person who undertakes to distribute religious literature on the
premises of a company-owned town contrary to the wishes of the town’s management.”
Marsh, 326 U.S. at 502. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Reed framed the issue as whether
the First Amendment required a state to “commandeer, without compensation, the private
property of other citizens” to “furnish[] the opportunity for information, education and
religious enlightenment.” Id. at 515 (Reed, J., dissenting). Despite important differences
between the two framings, both assumed that the state court, not the private company,
constituted the state actor to whom the First Amendment applied. A similar assumption
informed the majority and Justice Black’s dissent in Logan Valley. Indeed, neither opinion
even raised the possibility that the state court’s decision to enjoin picketing in the mall
failed to satisfy the First Amendment’s state action requirement. See Logan Valley, 391 U.S.
at 309 (framing the issue as whether “the decisions of the state courts [to enjoin the petitioners’] picketing as a trespass [were] violative of their rights under the First and
Fourteenth Amendments”); id. at 329 (Black, J., dissenting) (arguing that “the lower
court’s injunction [was] valid under the First Amendment”).
126. See Logan Valley, 391 U.S. at 318 (“The general public has unrestricted access to
the mall property. The shopping center here is clearly the functional equivalent of the
business district of Chickasaw involved in Marsh.”); Marsh, 326 U.S. at 507–08 (“Whether a
corporation or a municipality owns or possesses the town the public . . . has an identical
interest in the functioning of the community [such] that the channels of communication
remain free. . . . The ‘business block’ serves as the community shopping center and is
freely accessible and open . . . .”).
127. Logan Valley, 391 U.S. at 325 (citing Marsh, 326 U.S. at 506).
128. See, e.g., Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413, 413–14 (1943); Hague v. Comm. for Indus.
Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515–16 (1939); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 164–65 (1939). Professor
Harry Kalven first coined the term “public forum.” See Harry Kalven, Jr., The Concept of the
Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 11–12 (“[I]n an open democratic
society the streets, the parks, and other public places are an important facility for public
discussion and political process. They are in brief a public forum that the citizen can
commandeer . . . .”).
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the state courts charged with enforcing the private owner’s property
rights did so in a discriminatory manner or that the laws themselves were
content based. Nevertheless, in both cases, the Court held that the courts’
actions violated the First Amendment because its effect was to make some
members of the public—those who because of geography or economic
circumstances patronized privately owned, as opposed to governmentowned, public spaces—second-class citizens when it came to their First
Amendment rights.
Indeed, both opinions were very explicit about the fact that the
constitutional problem with the government’s actions in both cases was
its impact on the substantive equality of those it affected. “Many people,”
Justice Black noted in his opinion in Marsh, “live in company towns.”129
Were it the case that the principles that governed the public forum cases
did not protect them merely because they spoke on privately owned streets,
he argued, it would be much more difficult for these “free citizens” to
access the uncensored information necessary to “make decisions [about]
the welfare of [their] community and nation.”130 It would block up the
“channels of communication” in those spaces in which residents of company
towns happened to live and work, thereby depriving them of access to the
same information that those who happened to patronize publicly owned
spaces enjoyed—and this the Court refused to allow.131 “There is no more
reason for depriving these people of the liberties guaranteed by the First
and Fourteenth Amendments,” Black insisted, “than there is for curtailing
these freedoms with respect to any other citizen.”132
Justice Marshall, who wrote the opinion for the Court in Logan
Valley, similarly noted that denying speakers a constitutional right of
access to privately owned shopping malls would make it much more difficult “for workers seeking to challenge substandard working conditions,
consumers protesting shoddy or overpriced merchandise, and minority
groups seeking nondiscriminatory hiring policies” at a mall shop to do so
than it was for those who wished to communicate the exact same message
about a shop located on a public street.133 “Neither precedent nor policy,”
Marshall concluded, “compels a result so at variance with the goal of free
expression and communication that is the heart of the First Amendment.”134
By reconceiving Marsh as a state action case, the Court signiﬁcantly
limited its reach and transformed its meaning. It rendered it simply
another illustration of the well-established formal-equality rule that content129. Marsh, 326 U.S. at 508.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 507.
132. Id. at 508–09.
133. Amalgamated Food Emps. Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S.
308, 324–25 (1968), overruled by Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
134. Id. at 325.
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based discrimination at the hands of a state actor violates the First
Amendment guarantee, except in the most exceptional circumstances.
Transforming Marsh into a state action case also made it easy to explain
why Logan Valley was incorrect and had to be overruled—which it was,
just eight years after it was handed down.135 After all, running a shopping
mall is not an important state function, let alone something that has
tended to be exclusively (if ever) performed by the government. Read on
their own terms, however, Marsh and Logan Valley point to a much more
expansive conception of the guarantee of expressive equality: one that
prohibits the enforcement of even well-intentioned laws that have a
disparate effect on the ability of some members of the public to access
the “channels of communication” or otherwise participate in public debate.
Scholars have criticized both decisions, but particularly Logan Valley,
for deﬁning the scope of the First Amendment’s application too elastically. Professor Frederick Schauer, for example, has argued that the
Logan Valley Court erred by extending First Amendment access rights to
speakers on private property even when the owner of that property does
not possess “powers equivalent to those of the state.”136 This is a mistake,
Schauer argues, because it threatens the vitality of the marketplace of
ideas by depriving private property owners of a right the First Amendment
permits them: namely, the right to discriminate against speech because
they dislike it, fear it, or for any other reason.137
It is certainly true that a central assumption of modern free speech
law is that the First Amendment is not intended to prohibit private discrimination. Quite the contrary: By prohibiting the government from discriminating when it comes to speech, the First Amendment is supposed
to encourage private discrimination by protecting speakers against retaliation from the government for the expressive choices they make and the
stances they choose to embrace or reject. As Schauer notes: “[T]he ideals
of free public debate and a marketplace of ideas presume that there will
be partisanship and preference for some ideas over others”—that private
persons can and will discriminate, even though the government won’t and
shouldn’t.138
But nothing in either Marsh or Logan Valley contradicts this general
principle. Because neither decision presumed that the private property
owner was a state actor, neither decision requires that the same constitutional constraints that apply to the government as owner of public property apply to those who own company towns or shopping malls. In fact, in

135.
136.
137.
138.

See Hudgens, 424 U.S. at 520–21.
Schauer, supra note 123, at 454.
Id. at 450.
Id.
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Logan Valley, the Court explicitly acknowledged as much.139 The Court
reaffirmed this point several years later when it held that, even if mall
owners could not be compelled by the First Amendment to grant access
to their property, they might be compelled to do so by their state
constitutions.140 The Court made clear, however, that this could be true
only in cases in which the grant of access did not undermine property
owners’ expressive freedom by forcing the owners to associate with views
they reject.141 It recognized that private property owners enjoy a degree
of constitutional protection that the government, when it regulates the
public forum, absolutely does not possess.142
Marsh and Logan Valley do not, in other words, obliterate the distinction between state and private action upon which the First Amendment
depends. What they suggest instead is that the scope of First Amendment
application need not be coterminous with state property rules and that
facially neutral and well-intentioned laws might violate the First
Amendment because of their disparate effects.
Properly understood, both cases represent in this respect what we
might describe with not too much overstatement as a radical—and much
more speech-protective—alternative to the current approach to constitutional claims of access to private property. It is an approach, nonetheless,
that emerges out of, and is entirely compatible with, the foundational
assumptions of modern free speech law—chief among these being that the
purpose of the First Amendment is to create an “uninhibited, robust, and
wide-open”143 public sphere in which all kinds of viewpoints, and classes
of people, can participate.
B.

Media-Access Cases

A similarly substantive vision of the First Amendment’s equality guarantee—and a similar willingness to prioritize the expressive rights of the
public over private property rights—characterizes the sequence of cases,

139. Logan Valley, 391 U.S. at 319 (“[I]t may well be that respondents’ ownership of
the property here in question gives them various rights, under the laws of Pennsylvania, to
limit the use of that property by members of the public in a manner that would not be
permissible were the property owned by a municipality.”).
140. PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980) (“Our reasoning in Lloyd . . .
does not ex proprio vigore limit the authority of [a] State . . . to adopt in its own Constitution
individual liberties more expansive than those conferred by the Federal Constitution.”).
141. Id. at 87.
142. Indeed, if anything can be said to be a core principle of modern free speech law,
it is that the government may not exclude speech from the public forum to promote its
own ideas. See, e.g., W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (“If
there is any ﬁxed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty,
can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of
opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.”).
143. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
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beginning with Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC in 1969144 and ending with
the decision in Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC in 1997,145 in which
the Court held that Congress could require media companies to transmit
speech not of their choosing when doing so promoted an “uninhibited,”
as opposed to a “monopoliz[ed],” marketplace of ideas.146 These are
amazing cases to read today, given the Court’s renewed insistence that
“[t]he concept that government may restrict the speech of some . . . in
order to enhance the relative voice of others” is one that “is wholly foreign
to the First Amendment.”147 In fact, all of these cases endorse, to one degree
or another, this supposedly foreign concept.
This is obviously true of Red Lion. In that case, the Court upheld against
constitutional challenge a series of FCC regulations that required broadcasters to give those they criticized, or the opponents of political candidates
they endorsed, a right of reply.148 A Pennsylvania radio station and its
president argued that the rules violated the First Amendment by denying
them rights that other speakers enjoyed: namely, the right to “refus[e] in
[its] speech or other utterances to give equal weight to the views of [its]
opponents.”149 Their claim, in other words, was that the rules undermined
the constitutionally protected right of broadcasters to privately discriminate,
thus violating their formal equality. The Court rejected this argument. It
concluded that the rules “enhance[d] rather than abridge[d] the freedoms
of speech and press protected by the First Amendment.”150 It justiﬁed this
conclusion on a number of grounds.
First, it argued that radio licenses were scarce and the privilege of
owning one was not constitutionally guaranteed. The fact that only relatively few people could exercise the right to speak in this manner, the
Court argued, meant that those who did could be required to “share
[their] frequency with others and to conduct [themselves] as a proxy or
ﬁduciary with obligations to present those views and voices which are representative of [the] community and which would otherwise, by necessity,
be barred from the airwaves.”151 The Court concluded, in other words,
that under conditions of scarcity, the voices of some could be restricted in
144. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
145. 520 U.S. 180 (1997).
146. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 388–90; see also Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium,
Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727 (1996); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner I ), 512 U.S. 622
(1994); Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
147. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 349–50 (2010) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48–49 (1976) (per curiam)); see also Ariz.
Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 564 U.S. 721, 741 (2011).
148. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 373–74.
149. Id. at 386 (“No man may be prevented from saying or publishing what he thinks,
or from refusing in his speech or other utterances to give equal weight to the views of his
opponents. This right, they say, applies equally to broadcasters.”).
150. Id. at 375.
151. Id. at 388–89.
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order to enhance the voices of others. It reached this conclusion because
it believed—not implausibly—that any other conclusion would threaten
the vitality of the marketplace of ideas by allowing it to be dominated by
a few powerful voices.
This is a tenable argument—and it was certainly one that, at the time
Red Lion was handed down, had been made before. Twenty-ﬁve years earlier, Justice Frankfurter had relied on a similar scarcity rationale to sustain another set of FCC rules against First Amendment challenge.152
The problem with the argument was that, at the time Red Lion was
decided, it was no longer true that radio licenses were scarce—or, at least,
that the scarcity of radio licenses made radio any different than other media
of communication. As the radio station noted in its brief to the Court, by
1967, there were over three times as many commercial radio and television
stations in the United States as there were daily newspapers.153 The Court’s
insistence that, notwithstanding these facts, radio remained a scarce resource produced signiﬁcant criticism, both at the time and in the years to
follow.154
In fact, the scarcity of radio licenses was not the only reason the
Court provided to justify its conclusion that the FCC rules enhanced,
rather than abridged, freedom of speech, although it was certainly the
one the Court emphasized the most. The opinion also noted that “[e]ven
where there are gaps in spectrum utilization”—and therefore, licenses
that were not scarce—“the fact remains that existing broadcasters have
often attained their present position because of their initial government
selection in competition with others before new technological advances
opened new opportunities for further uses.”155 It continued:
Long experience in broadcasting, conﬁrmed habits of listeners
and viewers, network affiliation, and other advantages in program procurement give existing broadcasters a substantial
advantage over new entrants, even where new entry is technologically possible. These advantages are the fruit of a preferred
position conferred by the Government. Some present possibility
152. See Nat’l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 226–27 (1943) (“Unlike other
modes of expression, radio inherently is not available to all. That is its unique characteristic, and that is why . . . it is subject to governmental regulation. . . . The right of free
speech does not include, however, the right to use the facilities of radio without a
license.”).
153. Brief for Petitioners at 35, Red Lion, 395 U.S. 367 (No. 2), 1968 WL 129369
(reporting census ﬁndings that, as of 1967, there were “6253 commercial radio and television stations in the United States, compared to only 1754 daily newspapers, a ratio of better than 3½ to 1”).
154. See, e.g., Lee C. Bollinger, Jr., Freedom of the Press and Public Access: Toward a
Theory of Partial Regulation of the Mass Media, 75 Mich. L. Rev. 1, 10 (1976); Thomas W.
Hazlett, Physical Scarcity, Rent Seeking, and the First Amendment, 97 Colum. L. Rev. 905,
913 (1997); L.A. Powe, Jr., “Or of the [Broadcast] Press,” 55 Tex. L. Rev. 39, 55–57 (1976).
155. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 400.
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for new entry by competing stations is not enough, in itself, to
render unconstitutional the Government’s effort to assure that a
broadcaster’s programming ranges widely enough to serve the
public interest.156
As this passage makes clear, the purported scarcity of radio licenses
was not crucial to the Court’s holding in the case. What was crucial was the
Court’s belief that inequalities produced by both technological and historical factors had given the established networks signiﬁcant power to
decide what the public heard when it turned on the radio. The Court
recognized that, given barriers of entry, this disparity in power was hard
to redress by means of market competition. And the Court acknowledged
that the government itself had played an important role in fostering inequalities in the industry through its initial conferral of licenses. It was in
this context that the Court concluded that the First Amendment not only
allowed the FCC to mandate a right of reply but might even require it. As
Justice White wrote in his majority opinion:
It is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail, rather than to countenance monopolization of that market,
whether it be by the Government itself or a private licensee. . . .
It is the right of the public to receive suitable access to social,
political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences which
is crucial here. That right may not constitutionally be abridged
either by Congress or by the FCC.157
This is an unabashedly antisubordinating conception of the First
Amendment—one that adamantly rejects the idea that what freedom of
speech requires is formally equal treatment of all speakers. To the contrary: Like the most radical voices in the affirmative action debate, this
conception suggests that vindicating the constitutional guarantee of equality
might require policies designed to ameliorate signiﬁcant inequalities in
access to valuable resources—at least in cases where the government, in
its initial conferral of property rights, helped create those inequalities. It
certainly makes clear that, in cases where inequalities in power and
resources undermine the vibrancy and diversity of public debate, the government can restrict the speech of some in order to enhance the speech of
others.
It is also, of course, a vision of the First Amendment that the Court
soon renounced—not only in Buckley but also two years prior to that, in
Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, when it struck down a Florida law
that imposed a right-of-reply requirement on newspapers.158 As Justice
Burger made clear in his opinion in that case, the dysfunctions in the
newspaper industry that the Florida right-of-reply law was designed to
156. Id.
157. Id. at 390 (citations omitted).
158. 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974).
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ameliorate were remarkably similar to the dysfunctions in the radio
business that led the FCC to enact the rules challenged in Red Lion. Just
like the radio industry, the newspaper industry was also highly concentrated.159 As a result, here too “the power to inform the American people
and shape public opinion” had been “place[d] in a few hands.”160 And
just as was true of radio, the problem of concentration in the newspaper
industry was not easily solved by the ordinary practices of market competition, given the steep barriers to entry into the industry.161 Nevertheless,
in Tornillo, the Court concluded that the First Amendment prevented
Florida from doing virtually anything to correct those problems and
insisted that in this context, it was the right of the speaker, not the listener, that was paramount. “A newspaper,” Burger wrote, “is more than a
passive receptacle or conduit for news, comment, and advertising.”162 It
instead is the product of “editorial control and judgment.”163 What this
meant was that, just as the First Amendment forbade the government
from telling individual persons what they could say, so too it prevented
the government from limiting the ability of newspaper editors (companies,
really) to determine what the newspaper would say.
It is hard to imagine a more dramatic rejection of the logic of Red
Lion. In place of that opinion’s concern with inequalities in access and
power, Burger’s opinion in Tornillo articulated a strict formal-equality
rule. Indeed, Burger made clear that even if Florida’s right-of-reply law
imposed no costs on newspaper editors—and therefore did not chill expression by forcing editors to choose between publishing critical opinions
and having to give up valuable space to replies (as the Florida law was said
to do)—a right-of-reply requirement would offend the First Amendment
by infringing on the editorial freedom of newspapers.164
As such, Tornillo appeared to provide newspapers a powerful shield
against not only right-of-reply laws but all kinds of access requirements.165
And not only newspapers. Nothing in its logic depended on the fact that
the media corporation involved in the case was a newspaper. What mattered instead was that the corporation performed an editorial function.166
159. Id. at 249–50 (“The elimination of competing newspapers in most of our large
cities . . . [is an] important component[] of this trend toward concentration of control of
outlets to inform the public.”). Moreover, Burger noted that the same interests that owned
radio and television stations also frequently owned newspapers too—the industries were
not merely parallel, they were tightly interlinked. Id.
160. Id.
161. See id. at 251.
162. Id. at 258.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. See, e.g., Passaic Daily News v. NLRB, 736 F.2d 1543, 1557 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(relying on Tornillo to deny the NLRB the power to order a company to reinstate a newspaper columnist whose column was taken away in retaliation against his union activities).
166. See Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 256–58.
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And indeed, in subsequent years, courts relied on the decision to invalidate access laws that applied to other kinds of media, as well as nonmedia
corporations.167
Tornillo’s reach remained limited in two important respects, however.
First, the opinion did not overrule (or in fact mention) Red Lion. In subsequent cases, the Court affirmed that Red Lion remained good law.168
This meant that the FCC retained authority to regulate broadcast media
in order to vindicate the right of the public to “an uninhibited marketplace of ideas.”169 Second, in subsequent years, the Court proved unwilling
to extend Tornillo as far as its logic suggested.
Consider in this respect the Court’s 1994 and 1997 decisions in
Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC.170 In that case, the Court was confronted with a First Amendment challenge to a federal law that required
cable companies to devote a portion of their channels to local broadcast
networks.171 The government argued that Red Lion should control the
analysis and that the law was therefore constitutionally unproblematic
because, although it constricted the freedom of cable providers, it promoted a vibrant marketplace of ideas by preventing cable companies from
using their market power to drive broadcast competitors out of business.172
The cable companies argued instead that Tornillo should control and that
the law was therefore unconstitutional.173
The Court rejected both arguments. It noted that technological
advances meant that soon there “may be no practical limitation on the
number of speakers who may use the cable medium,” and concluded that
Red Lion was therefore “inapt.”174 It argued, meanwhile, that Tornillo did
not control, due to the “important technological difference between newspapers and cable television,” speciﬁcally noting that “[a]lthough a daily
newspaper and a cable operator both may enjoy monopoly status in a
given locale, the cable operator exercises far greater control over access
to the relevant medium.”175 This was the case, the Court explained, because “[w]hen an individual subscribes to cable, the physical connection
between the television set and the cable network gives the cable operator
bottleneck, or gatekeeper, control over most (if not all) of the television

167. See, e.g., Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 11–12
(1986) (electric utility); Zhang v. Baidu.com Inc., 10 F. Supp. 3d 433, 436–37 (S.D.N.Y.
2014) (search engine).
168. See FCC v. Nat’l Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775, 794–95 (1978).
169. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
170. Turner II, 520 U.S. 180 (1997); Turner I, 512 U.S. 622 (1994).
171. See Turner I, 512 U.S. at 633–34.
172. See id. at 637.
173. Id. at 653.
174. Id. at 639.
175. Id. at 656.
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programming that is channeled into the subscriber’s home.”176 Instead,
the Court upheld the law as a reasonable means by which Congress
attempted to further what it described as “a governmental purpose of the
highest order”: namely, ensuring “the widest possible dissemination of
information from diverse and antagonistic sources.”177
The arguments the Turner Court made to distinguish the case from
Tornillo are, to put it mildly, unconvincing. As Professor Yochai Benkler
has pointed out, it is not the fact that they use physical cables to
communicate to their subscribers that vests cable companies with what
the Court called “gatekeeper . . . control” of a “critical pathway of
communication.”178 After all, competitors could simply install their own
cables in potential subscribers’ houses, thereby making it much easier for
customers to switch providers. What gives cable companies such power
are instead the economic conditions of the industry—speciﬁcally, the
“large ﬁxed costs of wiring a city, and the relatively low incremental costs
of distributing information once a city is wired.”179 And certainly Justice
Burger would have been surprised to learn that the very serious problems
of concentration in the newspaper industry he documented in his opinion in Tornillo were not so serious because they did not have a physical cause.
In fact, the opinion represents an approach to First Amendment
media-access questions that is strikingly similar to the reasoning of Red
Lion—and one that is quite difficult to reconcile with the analysis in
Tornillo. Even as it denied that the deferential approach the Court took
in Red Lion to regulations aimed at fostering diversity in the broadcast
media could be applied to regulations of cable, the Court employed
essentially the same argument as that made in Red Lion to uphold the
cable law against constitutional challenge. “The potential for abuse of
[the cable companies’] private power over a central avenue of communication cannot be overlooked,” Justice Kennedy asserted in his majority
opinion in Turner.180 “The First Amendment’s command that government not impede the freedom of speech does not disable the government
from taking steps to ensure that private interests not restrict . . . the free
ﬂow of information and ideas.”181
As in Red Lion, the Court recognized that the government could
limit the expressive freedom of some, when they possessed disproportionate gatekeeping power, in order to promote the interests of the public

176. Id.
177. Turner II, 520 U.S. 180, 190–92 (1997).
178. See Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment
Constraints on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 354, 374 (1999).
179. Id.
180. Turner I, 512 U.S. at 657.
181. Id.
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writ large.182 As in Red Lion, it attempted to cabin the reach of its holding
by linking it to the unique physical characteristics of the medium in question. And, as in Red Lion, its attempt to do so proved far from persuasive.
Just as was true of Red Lion, however, the fact that the Turner Court
misidentiﬁed the cause of the inequality it recognized takes away nothing
from its legal argument. It merely suggests that the principle on which it
relied should apply more broadly than the Turner Court was willing to
acknowledge.
Like Red Lion, the decision in Turner is best understood as expressing a principle that is not easily cabined: namely, that constraints on the
expressive freedom of individual speakers may be permissible when those
speakers possess significant power to dominate the channels of communication and the regulations reasonably can be expected to promote (rather
than hinder) a diverse marketplace of ideas. Construed as such, the decision—like the decision in Red Lion—echoes the approach to the First
Amendment analysis applied by the Court in Marsh and Logan Valley.
Like those decisions, it forgoes formal equality to promote a more egalitarian and therefore more vibrant public sphere.
C.

Employer Speech

Consider one last example of the antisubordinating tradition in First
Amendment law—this time, a case that is far less beloved by progressives
than Marsh and Red Lion. This is the decision in NLRB v. Gissel Packing
Co., in which the Court upheld NLRB regulations that prohibited
employers, during the course of union elections, from communicating to
employees either a “threat of reprisal or force or promise of beneﬁt.”183
In upholding the regulation, the Court departed quite signiﬁcantly
from the principles that ordinarily govern the regulation of political
speech. Although First Amendment doctrine has recognized since the
early twentieth century that “true threats” may be punished without violating the freedom of speech, by the time Gissel Packing was handed down,
it was clear that the category of “true threats” was much narrower than
the relatively broad category of threatening communications the NLRB
regulations prohibited.184 Meanwhile, nothing in the cases held that the
182. See id. at 656 (“[S]imply by virtue of its ownership of the essential pathway for
cable speech, a cable operator can prevent its subscribers from obtaining access to programming it chooses to exclude.”).
183. 395 U.S. 575, 617 (1969) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting National
Labor Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 74-189, 49 Stat. 449 (codiﬁed as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(c) (2012))).
184. By 1969, the Court had made clear that the low-value category of “true threats”
did not extend to even “vituperative [and] abusive” speech that was “expressly conditional.” Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969) (per curiam). However, the
employer’s speech in Gissel Packing was expressly conditional. As Professor Julius Getman
notes, “[A]t no point did the employer directly threaten to close the plant or take economic
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government could prohibit litigants involved in electoral speech from
seeking to persuade voters to choose one option over another. Thus, if
the regulation were to be applied beyond the context of a union election,
it would have undoubtedly been deemed unconstitutional.
The Court nevertheless concluded that the regulation did not unconstitutionally abridge the employer’s expressive freedom, given the context
in which it applied. Chief Justice Warren explained:
Any assessment of the precise scope of employer expression . . . must be made in the context of its labor relations setting.
Thus, an employer’s rights cannot outweigh the equal rights of
the employees to associate freely, . . . [a]nd any balancing of those
rights must take into account the economic dependence of the
employees on their employers, and the necessary tendency of the
former, because of that relationship, to pick up intended implications of the latter that might be more readily dismissed by a
more disinterested ear.185
What is so interesting about this passage is its recognition of the
possibility that, given the hierarchical and economically dependent nature
of the relationship between the employer and the employee, the same
words might mean something different (and be intended to mean something different) than they would mean in another context. This fact led
the Court to conclude that rules developed to govern political speech outside the workplace—that is to say, in a context in which “the independent
voter may be freer to listen more objectively and employers as a class freer
to talk”—were not appropriate to apply in the workplace.186
Gissel Packing represents in this respect something like the antiGarcetti : Like Garcetti, it acknowledges that the hierarchical nature of the
workplace requires the application of different constitutional principles
than apply in the public sphere, where individuals confront one another
as citizens and equals. But rather than interpreting this to mean that employers should enjoy almost unbounded freedom to dictate the terms
and conditions of employment, it reaches the opposite conclusion. It
construes the First Amendment to allow a greater imposition on the employer’s freedom than would otherwise be the case. It recognizes, in
other words, the serious problem to expressive freedom that economic
inequality may represent and, like Marsh and Logan Valley and Red Lion,
shapes the First Amendment rules that apply to respond to this problem.
The result is, once again, a free speech jurisprudence that does not treat
all speakers alike but rather allows legislators and courts to take into

reprisals in retaliation for the employees’ voting for representation. Indeed, his comments
were all premised upon the likelihood of a union-called strike.” Julius Getman, Labor Law
and Free Speech: The Curious Policy of Limited Expression, 43 Md. L. Rev. 4, 6 (1984).
185. Gissel Packing, 395 U.S. at 617.
186. Id. at 617–18.
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account the economic and political attributes that constrain, or empower,
their expression.
III. THE ANTISUBORDINATING FIRST AMENDMENT THAT COULD BE
The discussion in the preceding Part is not meant to be taken as a
comprehensive cataloging of the cases in which the Court has interpreted
the First Amendment to promote substantive, as opposed to formal, equality.
To the contrary: There likely are other areas of free speech doctrine in
which the Court has at times departed from a strict rule of formal equality.
What the discussion in the preceding Part is meant to do is to make
clear that the anticlassiﬁcatory approach that currently dominates has
not always been so hegemonic. Even today, the formal-equality principles
that the Court claims have always guided the First Amendment—for example, the principle forbidding the government from “restrict[ing] the
speech of some . . . in order to enhance the . . . voice of others”187—cannot fully explain the unruly and capacious body of law that gives effect to
the constitutional guarantee of expressive freedom. After all, Marsh, Red
Lion, Turner, and Gissel Packing remain good law, even if the reach of
some of these cases has been blunted, their meaning reshaped by their
subsequent interpretation.
This suggests that critics of the Court may have to complicate their
analysis of its failings. Professor Owen Fiss argued in his 1986 essay Free
Speech and Social Structure that modern free speech doctrine (what he
called the “Free Speech Tradition”) is fundamentally ﬂawed due to its
tendency to make two largely incorrect assumptions.188 The ﬁrst is that
protecting individual autonomy inevitably ensures the “uninhibited, robust,
and wide-open” public debate the First Amendment is supposed to
guarantee.189 When power is distributed unequally, Fiss argued, this is
unlikely to be the case. Those with power will use their autonomy to monopolize expressive resources just like they monopolize other resources, thus
denuding the quality of public debate.190 The second incorrect assumption that underpins the modern Free Speech Tradition, Fiss argued, is that
the primary danger to free expression comes from the government.191
187. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48–49 (1976) (per curiam).
188. Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 Iowa L. Rev. 1405, 1414
(1986).
189. Id. at 1410 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)). Indeed, Professor Fiss argued that “[t]he Tradition assumes
that by leaving individuals alone, free from the menacing arm of the policeman, a full and
fair consideration of all the issues will emerge. The premise is that autonomy will lead to
rich public debate.” Id.
190. Id. (arguing that protecting speaker autonomy may not only “be insufficient to
insure a rich public debate” but “might even become destructive of that goal”).
191. Id. at 1414 (“Under the received Tradition, free speech becomes one strand . . .
of a more general plea for limited government.”).
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But in fact, Fiss pointed out, in our highly commodiﬁed public sphere,
private parties have the ability to shape in very signiﬁcant ways the overall
speech environment. This means that private parties possess similar, in
some contexts greater, power to stifle the voices of others than the government.192 Given its failure to grasp these two essential facts about expressive
freedom, Fiss argued that a “radical break” with the Free Speech Tradition
was necessary.193
Fiss is certainly correct that both of these assumptions play an
important role in the modern tradition. They help justify the different
rules that the Court tends to apply to public and private speakers, the stringent restrictions placed on content-based regulation of the public forum,
and the long-standing discomfort the Court has evinced toward redistributive speech policies.
The assumptions are nevertheless far from uncontested, as the mediaaccess cases demonstrate vividly. Indeed, in these and the other cases discussed in Part II, the Court recognized the possibility that the autonomy of
private actors could be constrained, consistent with the Free Speech
Tradition, when that autonomy poses a real threat to the robustness and
inclusivity of public debate. It also assumed that courts would take into
account the overtly private rules that govern property and contractual
relationships when interpreting freedom of speech. In other words, it
assumed that the First Amendment protected speakers against more than
intentional discrimination at the hands of the state.
That the Free Speech Tradition is somewhat more complex than Fiss
and other progressive critics have made it out to be should not be terribly
surprising. After all, the primary justiﬁcation that the New Deal Court
provided for applying heightened judicial scrutiny in First Amendment
cases was that doing so was necessary to protect the democratic system of
government from capture by those with economic, political, or social
power.194 Consequently, a central principle of the New Deal Court’s First
192. Id. (arguing that “[t]he state of affairs protected by the ﬁrst amendment can just
as easily be threatened by a private citizen as by an agency of the state” because the state’s
“peculiar kind of power is not needed to curb and restrict public debate”).
193. Id. at 1417.
194. This idea was articulated most famously by Justice Brandeis’s assertion in his
famous concurrence in Whitney v. California that freedom of speech was intended to guard
against “the occasional tyrannies of governing majorities.” 274 U.S. 357, 375–76 (1927)
(Brandeis, J., concurring). But it infused the New Deal cases as well. It helps explain, for
example, why the Court primarily relied upon First Amendment cases as support for its
assertion in the second paragraph of the famous Footnote Four of United States v. Carolene
Products Co. that heightened scrutiny is appropriate when laws “restrict[] those political
processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation.” 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (citing, among other cases, De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S.
353 (1937), Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697 (1931), Whitney v. California,
274 U.S. 357 (1927), and Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925)). The idea that judicial
scrutiny is appropriate when necessary to reinforce and defend the practices of democratic
representation against capture by dominant groups is most often invoked to justify
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Amendment cases was the idea that “[f]reedom of speech . . . [must be]
available to all, not merely to those who can pay their own way.”195 It would
be strange, given all this, had the Court not paid attention to social context
or material inequality when interpreting the First Amendment’s command.
In this respect, it is the current, much more formalist approach taken by
the Court to free speech questions that is much more difficult to reconcile with the New Deal Court’s insistence that the First Amendment was
meant not only to guarantee an individual right to autonomy in thought
and expression but also to facilitate and safeguard a particular kind of
social institution: namely, the democratic public sphere.
This is not to say that the earlier age was a golden era of progressive
judges, vindicating the public good in the name of the First Amendment.
But it does mean that there are resources within the modern tradition
that those dissatisﬁed with the current doctrinal arrangement can use to
make free speech jurisprudence more protective of the expressive freedom
of the “little people” and less protective of corporate power.
Think, for example, of what it could mean for the regulation of protest if courts were to treat the “ample alternative channels of communication” requirement that is recited in every time, place, or manner case
as a stringent constraint on the government’s powers rather than a parchment barrier. Surely one consequence would be to make it considerably
harder to justify the “free speech cages” and other content-neutral devices
that modern municipalities commonly employ to corral dissent at major
political events.196
Or consider what it might mean to the regulation of the digital economy if the First Amendment were recognized to grant a right of access
to privately owned but socially important sites of public expression, such
as Facebook, similar to that which Logan Valley extended to those who
wished to speak in privately owned shopping malls. Scholars routinely
dismiss the possibility that any First Amendment constraints apply, or
should apply, to internet companies such as Google and Facebook. They
argue that it would be inappropriate, and a very bad idea, to impose on
these companies the same duties of nondiscrimination that apply to the
heightened scrutiny in equal protection cases; however, as Professor G. Edward White has
shown, the Court initially made this argument in its First Amendment cases, particularly
those involving freedom of speech. See G. Edward White, The First Amendment Comes of
Age: The Emergence of Free Speech in Twentieth-Century America, 95 Mich. L. Rev. 299,
327–28 & n.83 (1996).
195. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 111 (1943).
196. See, e.g., ACLU of Colo. v. City & Cty. of Denver, 569 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1175 (D.
Colo. 2008) (upholding a content-neutral law that prevented protestors from being within
sight or earshot of the Democratic National Convention and discussing other cases in
which similarly restrictive content-neutral protest laws were upheld). See generally
Timothy Zick, Speech and Spatial Tactics, 84 Tex. L. Rev. 581, 581–82 (2006) (criticizing
the use of facially neutral time, place, and manner laws as “powerful weapon[s] of social
and political control”).
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government when it regulates speech.197 This is probably true—although
one should not overstate how broadly that prohibition applies.198 But Logan
Valley suggests that the First Amendment limits the actions of private actors
only when they stand in the government’s shoes. It, and Marsh before it,
suggest the possibility of a more nuanced constitutional rule.
Of course, one might worry that interpreting the First Amendment
in this more genuinely imperial manner would unduly limit the freedom
of powerful parties—be they the government or private companies—and
thereby undermine their ability to maintain the “good order upon which
[civil liberties] ultimately depend.”199 This concern is understandable.
Freedom of expression is not, obviously, the only interest at stake in First
Amendment cases. Speech can threaten, defame, clutter, and terrorize.
But to say that courts could, and should, interpret the First Amendment’s
command in a manner that is less constrained by the requirement of formal equality than contemporary free speech law is not to say that the
right to speak should always trump all other rights or regulatory interests.
Precisely the reverse: It is to say that courts could, and should, engage in
a far more realistic analysis than they currently do of the political, economic, and social realities that impede, or enable, the “uninhibited,
robust, and wide-open” public debate that the First Amendment is supposed to make possible200—and develop rules in response.
To this, one might object that requiring judges to take serious
account of economic, political, and social context would give them too
much discretionary power or require too much of them. One might query
whether judges have the capacity to engage in the contextual, ultimately
sociological analysis required to effectuate an antisubordinating vision of
the First Amendment. This concern also has merit. Certainly, cases such
as Red Lion should give one pause. After all, even those who generally supported the approach that the Court took in that case acknowledge that
the set of policies it upheld may have been normatively undesirable; by
imposing costs on broadcasters who criticized political candidates, they

197. That there is discrimination in how private media companies like Facebook moderate internet speech is evident. See Kate Klonick, The New Governors: The People, Rules,
and Processes Governing Online Speech, 131 Harv. L. Rev. 1598, 1653–55 (2018). For a
recent argument against extending First Amendment scrutiny to the actions of Facebook
and Google that assumes that doing so would require designating these companies as state
actors, see Tim Wu, Knight First Amendment Inst., Is the First Amendment Obsolete? 22–23
(2017), https://knightcolumbia.org/sites/default/files/content/Emerging%20Threats%20Tim
%20Wu%20Is%20the%20First%20Amendment%20Obsolete.pdf [http://perma.cc/YWN6-FSYJ].
Professor Tim Wu’s answer to the question he poses is yes—but it need not be.
198. As Part I makes clear, the government enjoys considerable power to discriminate,
both in institutions that are considered nonpublic forums and in public forums—when it
can do so via content-neutral rules.
199. Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 574 (1941).
200. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
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may have denuded the quality of public debate.201 This suggests that a
doctrine that allows more active government intervention in the media
environment might produce, in some cases, normatively undesirable results.
The problem is that there likely is no better alternative—at least if
one takes off the table dramatic changes in economic policy that would
reduce economic inequality and ensure that underlying differences in
the distribution of property rights do not seriously undermine the robustness and inclusiveness of public debate.202 Simply relying on the marketplace of ideas to solve the problem is no solution because, as Fiss noted
in his critique of the Free Speech Tradition, in many cases, the marketplace is the problem.203 And although some participants in this Symposium
have suggested self-regulation as an alternative solution to the obvious
failure of contemporary free speech law, it is hard to see why the corporate
interests of powerful private actors would sufficiently align with the
public’s expressive interests to make self-regulation an adequate substitute
for the carrot and stick of judicial intervention.204
In the end, vindicating the values that the Court has repeatedly said
it believes the First Amendment is intended to safeguard—chief among
these, the cultivation of a robust and inclusive public sphere that is necessary for the maintenance of a healthy democratic system of government—
may just require courts to engage in the difficult task of balancing the
often-competing constitutional interests at stake when the government
regulates speech either directly or indirectly.
The anticlassiﬁcatory approach that the Court employs today in both
its free speech and equal protection cases is very appealing because it
produces what appear to be crystal-clear rules. Absolutes are frequently
very comforting. In fact, one might question how clear the anticlassiﬁcatory approach is—particularly when it requires courts to ignore features
of the economic and political landscape that they believe (correctly) should
201. See, e.g., Fiss, supra note 188, at 1419–20 (noting that policies like the Fairness
Doctrine “seek[] to enhance public debate by forcing . . . broadcasters . . . to present
opposing sides of an issue . . . , but the fear is that [they] might work in the opposite
direction, . . . by discouraging [broadcasters] from taking chances, and by undermining
norms of professional independence”); Karst, supra note 10, at 49 (cautioning that a
“right of reply” requirement for broadcasters “will give added encouragement to an
editorial blandness already promoted by the broadcasters’ commercial advertisers”).
202. Even in a context of signiﬁcantly reduced economic inequality, one might worry
about social and political cleavages that make it difficult for some speakers to participate
in public debate. See Fiss, supra note 188, at 1412. I leave that to one side, however, given
that the kinds of redistributive economic policies that would make it necessary to think
seriously about noneconomic sources of inequality are unlikely to be enacted any time
soon.
203. See id. at 1413.
204. See Jack M. Balkin, Free Speech Is a Triangle, 118 Colum. L. Rev. 2011, 2025–28
(2018). In arguing for self-governance, Balkin assumes that the rules that govern classic
public forums would necessarily govern internet domains. However, this need not be the
case, as this Essay makes clear.
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matter to the analysis. Turner provides a good example of how, even
within a nominally anticlassificatory framework, courts can reach the results
they want.
Even if we assume, however, that the anticlassiﬁcatory framework
provides rules that do cabin judicial discretion more than the alternative
approach, it does so only by outsourcing all the difficult questions—who
shall speak? how shall they speak? what speech shall be permitted?—to
property and contract law, or (in the case of government institutions) to
internal regulations. Yet there is no reason to believe that the rules that govern those areas of the law were designed with any concern for free speech
values.
It is certainly true, as the Court reminded us in Citizens United, that
the First Amendment is predicated on a mistrust of government power.205
But it is far from obvious that a formal rule that cabins judicial discretion
provides any greater protection from the misuse of government power
than the alternative. In fact, the history recounted in this Essay suggests
that the opposite is true.
This is not to say that it will be easy to persuade the Court that the
First Amendment should be interpreted in light of a substantive conception of equality. The transformation of the First Amendment that this
Essay calls for may simply not be politically feasible right now. And yet
there is value in remembering both what the First Amendment has been
and what it may be again. Doing so reminds us that the free speech
guarantee is susceptible to multiple interpretations and that the disequalizing tendencies of contemporary free speech law are neither necessary
nor inevitable.
CONCLUSION
Supporters of the Roberts Court are fond of saying that it is the most
speech-protective Court in history.206 As this Essay has suggested, this is
quite simply not so. In many respects, the Warren Court was much more
solicitous of the rights of speakers than the Court is today. And we have
come far from the days when the Court routinely claimed that, when
compared to property rights, First Amendment rights occupied a “preferred position” in our constitutional scheme due to their importance to the
democratic system of government.207 It is true that today the First Amendment
205. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010).
206. See, e.g., Joel M. Gora, Free Speech Matters: The Roberts Court and the First
Amendment, 25 J.L. & Pol’y 63, 75 (2016).
207. See, e.g., Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 562 (1948) (“Courts must balance the
various community interests in passing on the constitutionality of local regulations . . . .
But in that process they should be mindful to keep the freedoms of the First Amendment
in a preferred position.”); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 509 (1946) (“When we balance
the Constitutional rights of owners of property against those of the people to enjoy
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provides a powerful protection to those who wish to use their property
for expressive purposes—and to guard against government efforts to regulate or restrict those uses—but it provides shoddy protection to everybody
else. This is a problem, not only because it means that constitutional protection is afforded to those who least need it. It is a problem because it also
means that the First Amendment is unable to effectively achieve its core
purposes.
This Essay argues that scholars need not reinvent the wheel to construct a First Amendment doctrine that does a better job of ensuring that
free speech rights are—in practice and not just in theory—“available to
all, not merely to those who can pay their own way.”208 Instead, they can—
and perhaps should—look to the First Amendment’s past as a guidepost
for its future. Even if the Roberts Court is unlikely to countenance the
reinvigoration of half-buried or ﬁrmly cabined precedents, the complex
history of the Court’s engagement with substantive equality provides scholars
and advocates with a vision of a First Amendment that is more sensitive to
private power and more attentive to the effects—and not just the purpose—
of government action. The antisubordinating vision of the First Amendment
sketched out in this Essay may be in exile now, but it need not be forever.

freedom of press and religion, as we must here, we remain mindful of the fact that the
latter occupy a preferred position.”); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 115 (1943)
(holding that the fact that a license tax was “nondiscriminatory is immaterial” and that
“[s]uch equality in treatment does not save the ordinance” because “[f]reedom of press,
freedom of speech, freedom of religion are in a preferred position”).
208. Murdock, 319 U.S. at 111.
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